

# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



*An American Quarterly  
Devoted to Russia  
Past and Present*

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## THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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# ***The Tragedy of the Russian Intelligentsia***

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

THERE is no greater tragedy than to see a long-cherished ideal realized, and then to find nothing but the dust and ashes of disillusionment in its realization. And this, as the world has only recently been reminded by Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago*, has been the tragedy of Russia's predominantly liberal and radical intelligentsia. The same point was driven home with equal force in a less-known novel which was actually published in the Soviet Union during the comparatively mild years of the New Economic Policy, V. V. Veresaev's *V Tupike*, translated into English under the title, *The Deadlock*.

Just because it represented such a small part of the population and because it felt keenly the repressive aspects of the bureaucratic regime maintained by the autocracy, the Russian educated class took its responsibility to the people very seriously. Of course there were many lawyers, doctors, teachers, and writers who simply went about their professions with little thought of politics. But, to a far greater degree than in Western countries, the Russian intelligentsia, which had come in contact with the ideas of the French Revolution, with the cloudy abstractions of German nineteenth century philosophy, with British parliamentary and constitutional practice, were committed to the ideals of freedom, progress, and social betterment.

Generation after generation of educated young people supplied its quota of martyrs for the revolutionary cause, committing themselves to what seemed a hopeless struggle against the military and police might of the Empire, which was indirectly supported by the illiteracy, ignorance, and political backwardness of the large peasant masses of the population. There is a continuous line of succession from the Decembrists, the group

of aristocratic army officers, filled with French revolutionary ideas which they had absorbed in Europe, who tried to establish a constitutional regime by *coup d'état* in 1825, to the conspirators and agitators who fought on barricades and organized assassinations of hated officials in 1905.

There is no parallel in any other country for the movement which developed in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century under the name, "going to the people." Large numbers of educated young people from comfortable homes set out on a kind of political pilgrimage to the villages, where they tried to work with the peasants as teachers, medical helpers, and in other ways, sometimes mixing in revolutionary propaganda with their social work.

There is an excellent description in Turgenev's *Virgin Soil* of the naive idealism and practical frustration of some of these young pioneers. It was most characteristic of the Russian intelligentsia to think in terms of grandiose schemes of social reconstruction, which would wipe out in one stroke the consequences of centuries of oppression, ignorance, and poverty. These schemes were all the broader and more ambitious because, under the autocracy, there was so little opportunity for individual initiative in practical methods of self-government. The famous radical publicist, Alexander Herzen, spoke of Russia as "the land of outward slavery and inward freedom." In most striking contrast to Great Britain, there was extremely little room in the mentality of the typical Russian intellectual for considerations of gradualism, of compromise, of making haste slowly.

Until the last decades of the nineteenth century most of the utopian ideals of the Russian revolutionaries centered around the peasant. The ideal was to overthrow the autocracy, to distribute the land among the peasants and to organize free co-operative communes, for which the old Russian village society, the *mir*, was considered a precursor.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century Marxist theory penetrated Russia and was accepted with a literalness and a passion that could scarcely be found in the socialist parties of the politically freer and economically more advanced countries of Western Europe. These two currents, the *narodnik*, or popu-

list, and the Marxist, continued to flow side by side, the Marxists also being divided between the more extreme Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, and the more moderate Mensheviks, whose leaders were Martov and Dan. Even the Mensheviks, by West European socialist standards, were often pretty extreme — another indication of the absolutist uncompromising nature of Russian revolutionary theory, caused, at least in part, by the divorce of most Russian intellectuals from any of the responsibilities of practical administration.

The Tsarist regime survived the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, the naval mutinies and peasant riots and the street fighting in Moscow during the turbulent years 1904-1906. Its fall in March, 1917, was a collapse rather than a conscious seizure of power by any revolutionary group. A few loyal regiments of troops in Petrograd could have suppressed the street demonstrations which touched off the revolution. But on the decisive day, March 12, the troops went over to the side of the demonstrating crowds.

The dream of generations of Russian liberals and radicals suddenly became a reality. And for a short time there was a honeymoon, a period comparable with the first bloodless phase of the French Revolution. People embraced on the streets; there was an endless flow of oratory; revolutionaries who had been freed from prison and forced exile were given rousing receptions.

But for the humane idealists of the Russian intelligentsia disillusionment was not long in coming. The Provisional Government, in which they predominated, although full of good intentions, failed to fulfill the first requirement of any government, which is to govern. It could neither wage war nor make peace. It could neither stop the growing wave of anarchy and spoliation in the Russian countryside nor take the bold decisive steps which might have staved off the Bolshevik coup: withdrawal from the war and transfer of most of the land in private possession to the peasants.

The tragedy of the intelligentsia was completed when Lenin set up what he called the dictatorship of the proletariat. Except for the small minority who were dedicated Communists (and for many of them disillusionment and sometimes death were in

store in the time of Stalin's paranoid purges) the Soviet regime was a ghastly denial of every principle in which they believed: freedom of thought, speech and press, liberty under law, harmonious co-operation in working toward a new social order.

What made the disappointment still more bitter was that the new regime called itself socialist and revolutionary. Yet it restored many of the most hated features of the Tsarist regime, and often carried the application of these to lengths quite without precedent in the later and milder phase of autocracy. Arrests without warrant and shooting without trial, concentration camps, ruthless censorship of literature and the arts, a press turned into a mere propaganda instrument for the group in power, a system in which almost everyone was spying on almost everyone else. These were not the ideals which the Russian intelligentsia cherished before the Revolution, for which many paid the price of sacrificing advancement, liberty, in some cases even life.

And the Russian masses, whom the intelligentsia often sentimentally idealized, did not behave at all as they were supposed to behave in the idyllic revolutionary dream. The peasants, instead of forming co-operative communes, displayed more interest in looting the big estates and, in Ukraine, in making pogroms far bigger and bloodier than any known under the Tsars. The worker in the Cheka could be even more brutal than the Tsarist police official. What, of all the Bolshevik propaganda themes, caught on most successfully with the masses was a blind, indiscriminating class hatred, directed not only against oppressive officials and grasping landlords, but against anyone who showed a trace of middle class origin, of having enjoyed a good education.

Some of the disillusionment of the intelligentsia with the harsh and brutal revolutionary realities was self-invited — a product of utopian doctrinaire illusions about human nature in general and the nature of the Russian masses in particular. But this did not make it easier to bear, especially when, as often happened, the children of the old liberals became, or pretended to become, tough, hardboiled young Communists.

The Cossack Gregor, hero of Sholokhov's epic novel, *The*

*Quiet Don*, expresses envy for those who could make up their minds to be one hundred percent Red or one hundred percent White. Gregor himself wavered in his feelings and reactions and never felt altogether happy when he was fighting on the side of the White. And, although a considerable number of educated Russians escaped abroad, at various times and by various means, and found a more or less happy asylum in many foreign lands, few achieved the inner satisfaction that might have come to a man who fought Communism with arms in his hands as long as resistance was possible.

Much more typical was the reaction of Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago. He was a liberal or radical with rather vague socialist ideas and he welcomed the downfall of the Tsar. Even when living conditions became impossible in Moscow and the big cities in the first years of Soviet rule he felt no impulse to get a rifle and join the nearest White Army. What he tried to do was what the Abbe Sieyès boasted was his achievement during the French Revolution; he tried to stay alive and keep his family alive.

Finally the impact of a ruthless age crushes Zhivago, physically, morally, psychologically. The story of his life and death, made famous throughout the world by the enormous circulation of Pasternak's novel, might almost be called a requiem for the Russian intelligentsia.

This same problem, of the liberal or radical intellectual, caught between the two millstones of Red Revolution and White counter-revolution, unable in his heart to sympathize with either, repelled by the fierce excesses of both sides in a class civil war is presented in *The Deadlock*. Here the central character is Katya, daughter of a retired professor who was frowned on as too liberal by the Tsarist police, but who hates with all his heart the crude dogmatism and organized lying of the Communist regime.

Katya's reactions are very much those of her father. Her sister Vera is a dedicated idealistic Communist who dies willingly for her faith when the Whites get the upper hand. Katya cannot share this faith. Yet she breaks off with her lover, a young White officer, mainly because she feels her heart is not with the



Whites. Finally, at the end of the novel, she disappears "no one knows where" — a symbolic touch indicating the fate of the Europeanized, civilized intelligentsia as Russia sinks deeper into the abyss of physical misery and reversion to the most savage times of medieval Russian history.

It was my privilege to know Veresaev personally in Russia. He was a human being of rare quality, deeply cultured without affectation, erudite without pedantry, and a man of crystal clear integrity. He once remarked that he had been told by high Communist sources that his novel, which was barely permitted by the censorship, would receive high official acclaim if he would make Katya become a Communist in the end. It would have been morally and aesthetically impossible for him to do this, just as it would have been impossible for Pasternak to transform his Zhivago into a Red commissar.

When the pressure for ideological conformity became extreme, Veresaev stopped writing on current themes and prepared some scholarly works on Pushkin and some translations of classical Greek poems. It was in this kind of "internal emigration" that many of the old Russian intelligentsia remained intellectually active and at peace with their consciences. Very typical was a remark which I still remember hearing from Veresaev:

"Now there is a campaign to make us writers sign a protest against the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti. Of course we would want to protest if these men are innocent victims of persecution. But there are so many worse cases in the Soviet Union against which we cannot protest, which we may not even mention."

In the years after I left Russia I noticed that in the frequent servile tributes of Soviet writers to Stalin, "Sun of the universe," the name Vikenty Vikentievich Veresaev was always absent.

Another friend in Russia whom I always remember as a typical pre-war intellectual was even sharper in his rejection of the Soviet regime than Veresaev, because his revolutionary commitment had been stronger. He had actually fought on the barricades of Moscow in the 1905 uprising. When we last met,

shortly before I left Russia in 1934, we spoke with the frankness of those who do not expect to meet again.

"I can never forgive myself," he said, "that I gave the best years of my life working for what has become a most horrible tyranny. It was the kind of blunder that is worse than a crime."

Increasingly the Russian old intelligentsia belongs to history, although its members still play a large role in Soviet scientific and scholarly institutions. A younger educated generation has grown up under Soviet institutions with inevitable differences of outlook from that of the older men and women who can remember the way of life and the cultural standards that prevailed before 1917. The example and the quiet self-sacrificing work of the old intellectuals, one may be sure, has been a force of incalculable benefit in keeping alive a spark of humanistic culture that may at some future time kindle into a flame. Meanwhile those who, like myself, have counted and still count friends among the old Russian intelligentsia will salute the memory of this unique group with sympathy for its tragedy of disillusionment in its own generous hopes, and with deep affection and respect.



# ***U.S.S.R. Revisited***

*By* **FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN**

**T**HE writer had the good fortune to be included in a group of five Americans who arrived in the Soviet Union on November 3, 1958, and spent an exciting, sometimes strenuous but always fascinating four weeks in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Tbilisi. Our time was about evenly divided between more or less formal conversations with Soviet educators, psychologists, youth leaders and officials, and in casual encounters with a wide range of Soviet citizens in the streets, in restaurants, trains and airplanes. Our group consisted of three distinguished American psychologists, an American librarian, and one political scientist. A little over half of our time was spent in Moscow, with five days in Leningrad, four in Tbilisi and one in Kiev.

We found much in the U.S.S.R. to encourage hope for the future of the Soviet peoples and for an eventual easing of international tensions. The impression that this writer formed, during a trip in the summer of 1956, of a diminution in fear and a relaxation of the police regime, was confirmed and strengthened on this journey. At the same time, the question remains whether or not the relatively happy situation which we observed can continue indefinitely as long as the Soviet Union remains a total dictatorship. In many instances people who were still living in exile in 1956 have returned to Moscow. In spite of the partial return to ideological orthodoxy which began early in 1957, perhaps partly as a result of Kremlin fear that Hungarian and Polish intellectual ferment might spread to Soviet youth, the man on the street in Russia in November, 1958, seemed to be even a little more relaxed and easy to talk to than in June and July, 1956. Whether or not the same could be said of Soviet intellectuals is difficult to know. The caution with which the scholars and intellectuals whom we met approached political questions might indicate that they were in a some-

what more anxious mood than they were a year or two earlier, but we lacked a firm basis for comparison, since even this writer during his 1956 trip did not have quite the same type of experiences as in 1958, and none of the other four members of our group had been in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin. Only one of the others, in fact, had ever been in Russia, and since he was there in 1947 and 1948 when the "cold war" was reaching its most frigid stage, his perspective was somewhat different from any of the others.

Among the many hopeful aspects of the present scene which came within our range of experience, directly or indirectly, two perhaps deserve particular mention. All three of the psychologists who formed the core of our party delivered lectures to Soviet colleagues. The Americans chose the topics and content of their lectures and no preliminary conditions were attached to these performances. All of us, and this writer in particular, talked to American students studying at Moscow University and at Leningrad University under the United States-Soviet agreement on cultural and educational exchanges. While the American students in Russia were in a situation somewhere between that of the free life—students in the United States or Western Europe and the status normally provided for tourists in Russia—the mere fact that American students were being given the opportunity to come in contact with Soviet students and professors and to observe so many aspects of Soviet life so much more closely than diplomats, correspondents, or ordinary tourists can possibly hope to, was symbolic of the change which had taken place in communication between the Soviet Union and the outside world since the death of Stalin.

On the darker side of the picture, one must note that jamming of all foreign radio broadcasts in the Russian language continued unabated. Occasionally, English-language broadcasts are also jammed, and one night we heard the jamming of most of the portion of a Voice of America broadcast which dealt with the case of Boris Pasternak. However, the English-language broadcasts of the VOA and the BBC are immensely popular and we were told that the head of the English Department at the University of Moscow had recently told a foreign ambassa-

dor that Soviet students were learning the American pronunciation of English by listening to the VOA. The VOA music programs, especially its jazz program, were apparently extraordinarily popular and, like other recent foreign visitors, we learned that jazz musicians, and jazz lovers in general, make their own records by taping the VOA jazz broadcasts.

While the police system has probably been partially disbanded and in any case is not working with anything like its Stalinist harshness, it was still there and in many ways its presence is felt. For example, whenever crowds gathered around foreigners during the November 6th and November 7th Anniversary holidays became a little too large or a little too boisterous from the viewpoint of the police, they were quickly and efficiently broken up. As in 1956, the writer was again told that account is taken of visits by Soviet citizens to the hotel rooms of foreigners. On one occasion, a member of our group observed that a Soviet citizen, still in a gay mood after a party, was detained by the police after several warnings in a restaurant that his loud talk regarding military service in Korea and China during the Korean War was not discreet.

Fantastic misrepresentations of American foreign policy and American life in general continued to dominate the content of the Soviet press and radio. To some degree the impact of this propaganda was reflected in statements made to us by Soviet citizens about the international situation. However, such evidences of unfriendliness as we encountered were only a minor note in a chorus of friendliness. Occasional displays of hostility or even of arrogance seemed to represent surface attitudes under which there was a deep desire for friendly relations. Nevertheless, a feeling of anxiety pervaded many of our encounters with Soviet citizens. Moreover, we encountered much evidence that Soviet people think of American "capitalism" in terms of archaic stereotypes and this fact furnishes a basis for acceptance of anti-American propaganda.

We encountered mixed moods of anxiety, hope, envy, and curiosity when our conversations with Soviet citizens turned on relations between Russia and America. We sometimes used to ask our Soviet hosts what they thought we could do specific-

ally to insure peace. As a rule, they limited themselves to the cautious answer that "contacts," in particular, friendly gatherings around the banquet table, could do a great deal for the cause of peace. The cautious reply usually given to such a question suggested that our hosts, while certainly sincere in their desire for peace, did not feel that they as individuals or as scholars, could take upon themselves the responsibility of recommendations about policy matters. It is also possible that our hosts wanted to preserve the distinction, of which they made much, between "science," and "politics."

Certainly there is genuine fear of war at most, probably all, levels of Soviet society. The spontaneity with which matters of peace and war come up in the most casual conversations is perhaps sufficient proof that many Soviet people at least partly accept the Kremlin image of the United States as a threat to Russia. For example, hardly had the writer and a friend disclosed to a waiter in one of the leading Moscow restaurants the fact that we were Americans, when he observed "our governments don't get along very well, do they?" And yet, while superficially unfriendly, this man very quickly burst into a broad smile and engaged in a very friendly conversation which lasted for about an hour.

Mostly related to the Soviet attitude toward matters of war and peace is the pride and satisfaction expressed by many Russians about Soviet earth satellites. A number of persons brought up this theme, and whenever members of our group mentioned it or complimented the Russians on their space achievements, they beamed. The earth satellite was a main theme of the very attractive and colorful floats displayed in downtown Moscow during the November 7th parade. Laika, the dog carried into space by one of the Soviet sputniks is displayed on cigarette packages, one of which was presented to the writer by a Soviet citizen. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the way in which some Soviet people conceive of the sputniks as assurances of national security came to our attention at the end of a very warm and friendly conversation with a young Soviet movie director. For several hours we had talked of many subjects, ranging from international cultural exchanges through art and

Ukrainian and Georgian national customs and languages, with never a jarring note. But suddenly, as our plane was about to land, the Soviet motion picture executive asked his American traveling companion, "Do your diplomats understand the significance of the Soviet sputniks?"

It is interesting to compare Soviet attitudes toward Communist China with attitudes toward the United States. Judging by the evidence that came to the attention of this writer and other members of our group, there is considerable irritation in Russia with the Chinese. Of course, people accept the official line that Communist China is the great ally of the Soviet Union, and one sees portraits of Mao in the offices of directors of academies, in hotels, etc. Also, people are likely to ask Americans why the United States committed "aggression" against Communist China in the Taiwan Straits. On the other hand, several Russians made disparaging remarks to us about the Communist Chinese. We were told that Chinese students, for example, in Moscow and Leningrad, are "dirty," that they are unfriendly and work too hard and, in effect, take their Communism too seriously. One Soviet official told us with a grin that the Chinese thought they could achieve in ten years results in the field of education, and in progress toward the achievement of "full Communism" that which the Soviet Union, despite forty-one years of experience, knew would take several generations to achieve. We formed the distinct impression that, in terms of personal relations, Russians feel much more at home with Americans than with the Chinese Communists. As one fairly high-ranking Communist Party official put it, "we don't know anything about China." Since the same man said that he listened to the Voice of America, although he professed to dislike its broadcasts intensely, it was pretty clear that his interest in and perhaps his respect for the United States were greater than his corresponding sympathies for Communist China. Several Russians smiled, perhaps in embarrassment, when members of our group remarked that "Communist China is a powerful force."

While it is difficult to come to a firm conclusion regarding the degree to which Russians accept the official image of the United States as a military threat, it is perfectly clear to even the most



casual visitor that in many ways America is still regarded as a model of material and technical culture to be copied, and if possible, surpassed. Whether or not this admiration will long survive, in view of continued Soviet leadership in the space race, may perhaps be questionable.

We found many evidences of intense interest in the official United States-Russian language magazine *Amerika*. While we were told by some people that only "big shots" could buy it regularly, we also learned it could be obtained on the black market. One of the Russians who expressed this opinion had a copy of the magazine in front of him at a restaurant table. As in 1956, the writer of this report was approached by several Russians who desired to obtain copies of American newspapers and magazines. Also similar to the 1956 pattern was the interest expressed by Intourist guides in American literature, particularly in the novels of Ernest Hemingway. More than one Intourist guide expressed a desire to obtain recent American novels. On a higher intellectual plane, perhaps, was the keen interest displayed by Soviet psychologists and educators in American books and periodicals relating to their fields of professional interest. At the same time, the Soviet scholars whom we met expressed a profound desire to see Soviet publications in their fields translated into English. While we found encouraging evidence that many of the most recent American publications in psychology and education were available in the Soviet Union, it was also our impression that the supply of such material was still far too small to meet the demand, and that knowledge of its content was not nearly as great as one might judge from the confident assertions of some of the Soviet scholars whom we met to the effect that they were abreast of American material.

Our experience confirmed the observation of other travelers that it is extremely difficult to discuss political and ideological matters with Soviet citizens. Nevertheless, we found that one can learn a good deal about political institutions and attitudes by taking a tactful, indirect approach. In general, one can probably learn more about such matters as a by-product of conversations concerned primarily with non-political affairs than if one were to make a direct attack, which is likely to result in

the Soviet citizen's changing the subject, or resorting to evasive double-talk or even to Pravda-like harrangue. The responses of Soviet scholars to bluntly political questions can be ludicrous. For example, when one of the American psychologists asked a Soviet colleague, "What is the role of the Communist Party in psychology?" the latter replied, "I do not understand your question," stopped the car in which he and two Americans were riding and proceeded to point to and describe a building. When this writer asked two Intourist guides who the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Leningrad was, they did not answer. As in 1956, the writer found it difficult to induce Soviet citizens, even in informal conversations, to discuss political questions. However, it was possible to make what seemed to be illuminating inferences from nuances and even from omissions, both in formal and in informal meetings, and there were times, after wine or vodka had been consumed, when people spoke with amazing frankness.

Perhaps the most prominent and significant political attitude expressed by Soviet people in conversations with us was patriotic pride. It is difficult to know to what extent the frequent expressions that we heard of pride in Soviet achievement represented acceptance of Marxist faith and Leninist doctrine. Certainly there is much evidence that some major points of the official ideology, such as the superiority of a "Socialist" economy to one based on private property and private enterprise, are taken for granted by Soviet people. Somewhat similarly, Soviet people seem to accept the idea that American life is dominated by a crudely materialistic scramble to make money. However, when the author pointed out to one group of Soviet citizens that they too struggled to achieve status and the material advantages that went with it, they readily agreed. In this connection, it may be interesting to note that one man with whom we talked reported that the daughter of a Soviet diplomat who had served in North America had been presented by her father with an \$1800 mink garment, purchased in a New York department store. Perhaps it is also *à propos* to mention here that a Russian with whom we had a three-hour conversation one day in Mos-



cow made the somewhat cynical observation that in the Soviet Union "working men don't get fat."

Certainly we encountered no evidence of the kind of bitter, fanatical anti-Soviet attitude that this writer occasionally observed during his period of service in the United States Embassy in Moscow during and after World War II. On the other hand, we were sometimes surprised by the degree of casualness and even, perhaps, evasiveness toward authority displayed both by ordinary citizens on the street and by some government employees. While Soviet citizens undoubtedly know that the Kremlin could, if it considered it necessary, retaliate with ferocity against anything approaching organized opposition, those whom we observed in November 1958 certainly did not seem cowed or terrified.

The patriotic pride of which we have spoken was manifested in many specific ways but perhaps in its most general form by extreme touchiness regarding any real or apparent indications on the part of foreigners that they looked with condescension upon Russians. This national pride is displayed even by people who are deeply discontented with this or that aspect of Soviet life. For example, a university graduate in Leningrad complained that he could not find employment in the professional field for which he had been trained but he was extremely eager to establish the point that Soviet ballet, and in particular Leningrad ballet, was the best in the world. A very friendly, motherly hotel employee bristled when an American remarked that the small zipper bag purchased by the writer in a Soviet department store was "not bad." She wanted to know why a Soviet product should be referred to in disparaging terms. On the other hand, Soviet citizens often volunteer critical remarks about native goods and services or method. For example, when we asked a store clerk to explain the use of the abacus — which is still the almost universally used device for figuring bills in Soviet stores — she did so with alacrity and then half-apologetically remarked that "all foreigners regard this as a primitive device."

We have, perhaps, identified one important dimension of contemporary popular attitudes toward the Soviet social system. This consists of a mixture of pride in what has been accom-

plished under Soviet "socialism" combined in many cases with dissatisfaction because accomplishments so far lag far behind aspirations. This is a kind of hopeful dissatisfaction, of which the Soviet leadership takes account in its constant promises of improvement in the standard of living. Of course, in all of the big cities that we visited, the regime can point with pride to impressive, tangible evidences of improvement. In Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Tbilisi big new housing developments are either under construction or have been completed. Muscovites are proud of the new lines which have been added in recent years to the subway system. In fact, a Soviet professor took our group on a personally conducted tour of some of the impressive new subway stations on the night of our arrival in Moscow. Leningraders are equally proud of their new subway which was opened in 1956 and a reporter for one of the Leningrad newspapers made a special point of asking us whether we had ridden on their subway. A subway is under construction in Kiev, and there is much excitement in Tbilisi over the forthcoming introduction of cooking gas in that city. Many other aspects of material progress which elicit a favorable public response could be mentioned. One certainly is the increasing availability of consumer durable goods, including relatively cheap electronic goods, such as tape recorders and television sets, as well as passenger automobiles. It will certainly be many years before the peoples of the Soviet Union come to realize that prosperity in the form of millions of passenger cars on the road creates as well as solves problems. In the meantime, rapid expansion, from a small base, in the production of goods which a few years ago either did not exist at all or were available to only the tiniest fraction of the population, presumably not only generates national pride but redounds to the credit of the Soviet leadership.

A trip such as ours, confined mainly to the biggest and most prosperous cities, cannot shed much light on the standard of living of the Soviet peoples as a whole. One wonders, for example, whether the relative abundance of food, particularly of staples such as the extremely nourishing Russian and Ukrainian black and brown breads, but also of high-priced and excellent canned goods, especially fish, and a wide range of

alcoholic beverages, is typical of the country as a whole. As far as Moscow is concerned, this writer's inquiries of a few Soviet people brought such comments as "bread is now so plentiful that we throw it away."

The growing material prosperity, which is now beginning to seep down somewhat from the upper income groups to intermediate levels, is not the only source of what seems to be increased satisfaction with the Soviet regime on the part of the population.

In contrast to the fear-ridden atmosphere of 1947, when this writer completed four years of service in the American Embassy in Moscow, there seemed to be in November, 1958 a somewhat more normal relationship between government and population. Terror has been replaced, as far as I was able to determine, by respect for authority. I discovered at least some evidence that ordinary Russians are satisfied with the Khrushchev thesis that Stalin and in particular Beria, were responsible for wholesale arrests, exile and even execution of people unjustifiably accused of such crimes as treason. It is likely that most Soviet people would be reasonably well satisfied with a continuation of the present pattern of legal-administrative practice, lacking though it is, by Western standards, in safeguards of individual rights and civil liberties. There seems to be particularly great satisfaction with the abolition of the "Special Boards" of the MVD. Among Party members, and others who are identified most closely with the regime, there is probably a feeling that while Stalinist police methods were bad, Stalin's greatest mistake consisted in applying them to the wrong people.

There is also considerable satisfaction over the still limited, but increased freedom of access to foreign scientific and cultural materials and, in particular with increased contacts between Soviet people and foreigners. One Georgian noted with satisfaction that in respect to these matters the situation was much better than it had been under Stalin. Stalin's greatest mistake, according to this man, was cutting Russia off from contact with the outside world. However, he added that Stalin had to his credit "great services to the Soviet State."

In the spiritual realm, as in the material, we found evidence

of satisfaction with progress to date, but we also noted indications of a feeling that there is much to be accomplished. There is certainly evidence that some Soviet people, especially students and intellectuals, have a strong desire for vastly increased access to Western cultural materials and ideas. This craving for new ideas is accompanied by boredom with the current Soviet output in such fields as the arts and literature. Even among Intourist guides, one finds individuals who call themselves "classicists" and profess complete indifference to the whole range of Soviet literary production. It should be noted that such individuals are likely to be staunch and even chauvinistic Soviet patriots and firm believers in Soviet "socialism." One Intourist guide, for example, told me that he could not understand how there could be such a thing as a private university. The same individual told us with a perfectly straight face that there was no juvenile delinquency in the Soviet Union because of the beneficent influence of the Pioneer Palaces and other institutions which kept children off the streets and gave them something interesting and useful to do. Such instances of contradictory attitudes in the minds of intelligent Soviet persons should serve as a warning to us against the oversimplification which is the curse of so much writing about modern Russia.

While we were in the Soviet Union the Pasternak affair was at the center of international interest. Apparently, among Soviet students and intellectuals there were considerable differences of opinion about Pasternak. There was a good deal of sympathy with him, and in connection with Pasternak and his novel *Doctor Zhivago*, some people pointed out that because of the pressure of political controls over literature, most of the best writers had stopped writing entirely. We found that much less was known about Pasternak among Soviet people in their twenties and thirties than we expected. However, people who knew him only as a translator of Shakespeare were, in some cases, discovering his poetry and fiction. There was apparently a great demand for the few copies of *Doctor Zhivago* which had somehow been brought into the Soviet Union. Rather dramatic evidence came indirectly to this writer's attention indicating that some Soviet young people regarded Pasternak as a hero.

On the other hand, there was also substantial evidence that many, perhaps the majority of students in the literary, historical, and philosophical faculties of Moscow and Leningrad higher educational institutions accepted the official line condemning Pasternak as a traitor to Russia. Acceptance of the official point of view seems to have been based, in part, upon resentment of what was felt to have been exploitation in the West of the Pasternak matter in the interests of anti-Soviet propaganda.

While we were in the Soviet Union drastic educational reforms were under discussion. While the issues raised by educational reform are too complex to be discussed here, certain tendencies in Khrushchev's policies in this area can be identified. It was clear that Khrushchev and his supporters had decided that a potentially dangerous gulf was developing between "educated" persons and the mass of the Soviet population. There was also a feeling that graduates of secondary schools and higher educational institutions had received an excessively theoretical training, which did not fit them for the practical tasks of industry and agriculture. When, after the death of Stalin, it had been decided to introduce universal secondary education in the Soviet Union, acute social problems had been raised. This writer, in a conversation in 1956 with two *Pravda* editors had expressed the opinion that universal education would create difficult psychological problems because in the past graduates of the secondary schools, traditionally a very small fraction of the population, had usually gone on to some form of higher education and if this expectation were to persist, in the future those graduates of secondary schools who were denied access to higher educational institutions might feel deeply frustrated. Apparently this hypothesis has been proved correct. In order to restrict access to higher education to a percentage of the population which the Soviet economy could have absorbed, and at the same time to combat the deeply rooted Soviet tendency to despise manual labor, heavy doses of vocational training are to be introduced into the upper grades of the secondary school, and universal compulsory education is to be limited to eight years of combined elementary and secondary school. Furthermore, it was



planned to require that all but a very small percentage of exceptionally gifted children would have to work for several years in some kind of "practical" work between graduation from secondary school, if they were accepted into secondary school at all, and entry into higher educational institutions.

There seemed to be differences of opinion, even among the Soviet educators with whom we had formal conversation, regarding various problems posed by the projected educational reforms. Some, at least outwardly, favored the drastic and in some ways potentially upsetting plans set forth by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Others, probably a majority, appeared to think that interruption of the educational process by several years of outside work would have a decidedly harmful effect. One Soviet university graduate told an American while we were in Russia that he was very glad he had completed his education under the old system. On the other hand, a retired factory worker expressed enthusiastic approval of the projected changes. At least on the surface, the educational reforms bear an egalitarian stamp, like many other policies initiated by Khrushchev. It seems a safe bet that many of Khrushchev's policies are more popular with the Soviet "man in the street" than they are with intellectuals and bureaucrats.

However, although we felt that it would be dangerous to believe that there is any effective popular opposition to the Soviet regime under the leadership of Khrushchev, certain aspects of Soviet behavior as we observed it indicated a degree of susceptibility to foreign influence that helped to explain the continued existence of an elaborate, though somewhat modified, pattern of controls over information about the outside world. Whether or not some of these peculiar and even unique patterns of Soviet behavior are manifestations of potential opposition and rejection of the official ideology or other major features of the Soviet system is a matter for conjecture. Among these traits, which the writer had observed in 1943-47, and which, somewhat to his surprise, could still be observed in 1958, are an exceptional degree of curiosity about foreign ways and wares and a tendency, in spite of years of indoctrination in "Marxism-Leninism," to lionize foreigners. As we have already pointed

out, Soviet people can be easily angered by tactless statements made by foreigners. However, if they are approached in a friendly spirit, they respond with overwhelming cordiality. We found this to be particularly true in Georgia, where hospitality is almost a profession, but it was also extraordinarily conspicuous in the Russian and Ukrainian cities that we visited. A craving for new fashions and patterns in goods and manners, and perhaps in more important things, seemed to be widespread.

As we have observed, the Soviet scholars and educators whom we visited in their offices and laboratories appeared reluctant to discuss political or ideological questions. One had the feeling that this behavior had been determined from above, and was within the framework of the Kremlin's attempt to turn cultural exchanges of all kinds to its advantage by minimizing ideological and institutional differences and stressing the rather ambiguous concept of "coexistence." However, it was possible within the framework of our professional meetings to express many ideas obviously at variance with essential features of the Soviet ideology, without encountering open expressions of disagreement or displeasure on the part of our hosts. Certainly much that was said by our three psychologists in conversations and lectures must have seemed novel, to say the least, to their Soviet colleagues. Tactfully but clearly the American psychologists pointed out that in many fields of psychology such as those concerned with personality development and social movements, little or no work was being done in the Soviet Union. Even when the American psychologists stressed similarities of point of view between Soviet and American psychology in a way in which one might have thought would have brought vigorous denials, the ranking Soviet psychologists demurred only gently, noting that after all there were greater differences on certain points than the American psychologists appeared to realize.

On one occasion, the writer of this report had the opportunity of telling a group of Soviet psychologists and educators about his own work in the United States on the study of Soviet political institutions. This may have been an interesting experience for the Soviet group, since it is probably difficult for them to understand how there can be free and untrammelled study and



discussion of a thoroughly alien social system. At any rate, some evidence to this effect came to our attention, for a Soviet interpreter who had been present at the meeting where we spoke asked the author whether or not his courses on the Soviet Union were intended only for future diplomats. He was probably thinking in terms of the Soviet "Diplomatic School," an institution which trains Soviet diplomats and is restricted to carefully selected members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

One Communist official seemed to feel quite free to talk about the Communist Party and his work. When we asked him what was the function of the Communist organization in a factory, for example, he said that it was mainly to sign up the workers for greater production. This man was obviously a loyal Communist and he took the official Kremlin line on domestic and international questions. When he was asked whether or not the Soviet Communist Party desired the extension of Communism throughout the world he replied vigorously in the affirmative. He said that Communism was "a necessity" and that the desirability of the extension of Communism did not depend upon the wishes of the peoples among whom it was to be established. However, when the writer pointed out to him that the American people did not want Communism, he said that as far as he was concerned they could have any system they liked. As is so often the case with Soviet people, including even heavily indoctrinated individuals, this particular party worker gave me the impression of being far less doctrinaire than one might think such a person might be if one's information were based solely on reading official Soviet sources.

In the academies, institutes, and other places of learning that we visited we invariably observed such evidence of Party representation in and control over these institutions as notices of party meetings, special party gatherings devoted to the forty-first anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet regime, and the existence of offices where the Party organizations of the institutions transact their affairs. The abundant evidence of Party activity, combined with virtually absolute refusal on the part of scholars, educators, and scientists, some of whom were obvious-

ly Party members, to discuss or even to talk about the very important role played by the Party in their work and lives, imparted a certain air of unreality to our meetings with them. However, our group felt that in spite of this fact, it did succeed in discovering the general boundaries between "science" and "politics," two spheres, which, at least in their dealings with foreigners, Soviet academicians profess to regard as separable.

The writer asked one Soviet physician, with whom he had the opportunity of talking alone for a few minutes as we were leaving a hospital for the mentally ill, about the role of political institutions in his establishment. The physician replied that the Party organization in his institution "did not interfere" with the work of the experts and administrators, since, as he put it, Party members and experts were "the same people." He also said that the Party organization of the city in which his hospital was located did a great deal to facilitate his work. This sort of view of the relationship between Party organization and professionals and experts was confirmed by a very able and well informed foreign diplomat to whom the writer talked in Moscow. According to this source, while the Party, both at the level of particular institutions and at the level of the Central Committee in Moscow, exercises a wide range of powerful controls over the work of scientists, scholars and experts of all kinds, the latter usually succeed in establishing a reasonably satisfactory *modus vivendi* with the Party, since, as the diplomat put it, Party officials concerned usually do not know enough about scientific and technical matters to interfere very much with the work of institutions whose leadership consists of very highly trained personnel.

Like other travelers to the Soviet Union we encountered somewhat contradictory evidence regarding the effectiveness of the massive propaganda machine operated by the Communist Party. On the negative side, some Soviet officials whom we queried regarding their reading habits indicated that they "did not have time" to read Soviet newspapers or "had not succeeded" in getting subscriptions. It certainly appeared as if much of the Kremlin's propaganda rolls off the minds of the people like water off a duck's back. On the other hand, the indoctrination

received not only by press and radio, but in schools, kindergartens, Pioneer Palaces and other institutions has an enormous effect in moulding the minds of the Soviet people and in planting images and stereotypes which are all the more powerful, perhaps, because their holders are scarcely aware that they possess them. Perhaps the best general description of the situation created by living in the Soviet atmosphere of ceaseless, omnipresent indoctrination and conditioning — it is easy to understand why Pavlov is the patron saint of Soviet psychology — was given by a brilliant foreign diplomat who told me that in his opinion all Soviet people are intellectually “schizophrenics.” Everybody, he said, is equipped with a more or less impervious shell of official stereotypes and slogans, but underneath it is a human being. The problem of communication with Soviet people, which various foreigners have solved with varying degrees of success, but which always remains difficult, is that of establishing the best and quickest possible *rapprochement* with the human being hiding behind the ideological shell. Of course this probably is true in the case of people everywhere in the world, but the task is a particularly difficult one in relations between Russians, with their distinctive traditions, in some ways intensified under Soviet rule, of combined subservience to and mistrust of authority, and foreigners who are sometimes hampered in their efforts by impatience, credulity, or prejudice.

# Soviet Colonialism and Anti-Colonialism\*

BY W. W. KULSKI

I. P. PAVLOV is known for his famous experiments with dogs. It is less well-known that he devoted his later studies to human stimuli and that he singled out the *word* as the most powerful stimulus in influencing human actions. He sadly remarked that there were a great many human beings who reduced external reality to words and could be led by their sound. It would be preposterous to impute to the great scientist any intention of deducing utilitarian consequences from his studies. But it is not farfetched to say that Soviet politicians and propagandists have not let pass unnoticed the practical implications of Pavlov's teachings. If the dog's secretion of saliva could be increased by the ringing of the bell initially associated with food, why should not the word, the most powerful human stimulus, be used instead of a bell? Each word that conveys a general or abstract idea has historical and other associations and such words can

\* The Frederick A. Praeger publishing house has added eight important volumes to its valuable series on Russian history and World Communism. The volumes under discussion relate to Eastern Europe and all but one have been sponsored by the Mid-European Studies Center. Each volume contains not only a well-documented analysis of the Communist regime in a given country (politics, culture, and economics) but also a survey of the historical, geographical, and ethnic background. These volumes will serve as valuable reference books for specialists in the affairs of the Soviet bloc. The series includes the following books: Oskar Halecki, ed., *Poland*, 601 pp.; Vratislav Busek and Nicholas Spulber, eds., *Czechoslovakia*, 520 pp.; Ernest Helmreich, ed., *Hungary*, 466 pp.; Stephen Fischer-Galati, ed., *Romania*, 399 pp.; Alexandre Cretzianu, ed., *Captive Romania*, 424 pp. (this is the only volume which is not a part of the Mid-European Studies Center Series); Ivan Sipkov, *Legal Sources and Bibliography of Bulgaria*, 199 pp.; L.A.L. Dellin, ed., *Bulgaria*, 457 pp.; Robert F. Byrnes (introduction), *Yugoslavia*, 488 pp. This series of scholarly studies based on authentic Communist sources has been the inspiration for writing this article.

cause a pleasant or unpleasant reaction. The practical question is whether one can detach the original meaning and substitute a new one, perhaps the opposite, and still get the desired reaction through the mere sound of the familiar word and its complex of previous association of ideas. Soviet propaganda seems to have given a positive answer to the question. Communists, unlike Fascists, have not rejected the democratic vocabulary; they only substitute different meanings. Peace means support of Soviet foreign policy; democracy is the dictatorship of the Party leaders; social justice is a highly stratified society with a new upper class at the top; elections, free for the first time in history, constitute almost unanimous voting where the proportion of ayes and nays can safely be predicted years before the actual polling day, etc.

A good example of this technique is Communist anti-colonialism. Soviet-Chinese popularity in the underdeveloped countries is partly due to their anti-colonial propaganda. The same artifice is used by local Communists in fostering the so-called National Fronts. Anti-colonialism means anti-Westernism, in Communist parlance, the West being the main opponent to be isolated politically and economically from the underdeveloped areas. Once this main objective is reached, the fate of the non-Communists in the underdeveloped countries could be fairly quickly sealed. However, anti-colonialism has a different connotation for those countries. It spells anti-Westernism only insofar as a given country is still under Western colonial rule or has an open quarrel with a Western power. Otherwise it brings forth only the association of life as it was in the former colonial or semi-colonial period, and often with the racial superiority complex of which the nationals of former colonial powers were frequently guilty. Although the sources of anti-colonial feelings are various, being related either to a temporary situation of today or to the past, and although Western-Europe colonialism has practically disappeared from Asia and is retreating in Africa, anti-colonial emotions survive that provide Communist propaganda with a common denominator with the underdeveloped countries. The Soviet Union is immensely helped in this

propaganda by the mere fact that she has only opponents and no friends among the Western-European colonial powers.

It is high time to proceed with an analysis of the true meaning of the Communist slogan: anti-colonialism. This term evokes in the mind of anyone familiar with the post-war story of Eastern Europe an indissoluble association of ideas. Yet this instructive story is relatively unknown not because there is a lack of full documentation, particularly Communist, but because of a particular blindness of the underdeveloped countries and the defensive timidity of the West. The educated classes in the former colonial areas are so engrossed with their own urgent domestic problems that they pay little attention to the Soviet-Chinese record; they vividly recall their own colonial past and do not seem to show much interest in the fate of the European populations subject to the colonial rule of today. They remain discreetly silent even about their Asian brethren under the colonial rule of the Communist great powers: the thirty millions of Soviet Moslems, the forty millions of non-Chinese nationalities now under attack for their "bourgeois" nationalism, and the Chinese colonial protectorate in Tibet. However, the principle of national self-determination that brought and is bringing freedom to Asians and Africans becomes an empty sound manipulated according to the dictates of political expediency, since its application is invoked only against the Western powers and never in regard to the many millions of colonial peoples living in the territories of the Soviet-Chinese bloc. Moreover, the lack of interest in the fate of Eastern Europe could lead to the accusation of a "reversed" racial prejudice; the Asian-African bloc in the United Nations, for example, rallies together in all cases involving Asians and Africans but remains silent concerning the oppression of whites by their white masters. It is true that the Soviet-Chinese bloc's diplomatic support might be useful in a quarrel with a Western power, that the Soviet barter trade and loans are useful, and that it might be inconvenient to offend this bloc's great sensitivity by speaking frankly about its own affairs. Does it free the Asian-African intellectuals of their moral responsibility? A good knowledge of the Soviet colonial record might also be a healthy



reminder of the fact that, if Western influence were to be dislodged from Asia and Africa, a dynamic imperialism would step in with the same unscrupulous speed it displayed in Eastern Europe at the time when that area was opened by the power vacuum created by World War II.

This imperialism has two motivations: one, Communist Messianic spirit that will not be satisfied until the entire globe is covered by Soviet-like regimes, and secondly, by Russian nationalism reborn in the middle thirties and more active now than ever. Its potential vigor was revealed a long time ago. For example, was not China a victim at a time when the Communists called her, with false compassion, a semi-colonial country? Was not Outer Mongolia detached during that period when there was no opportunity for expansion in Europe? When Eastern Europeans were satisfied with the restrained Soviet foreign policy of the time, the U.S.S.R. was busy building her agricultural and industrial potential and the international situation did not then offer opportunity for great adventures, yet in 1929 China was the victim of a Soviet "Port Said" expedition. After the Chinese had tried to expel Soviet administration from the Manchurian railroads, the U.S.S.R. did not hesitate long before using armed force to impose on weak China respect for its colonial concession on the Chinese territory. There is a striking analogy between Chinese action in 1929 aimed at recovering control over the railroads and the Egyptian situation in 1956. The object of dispute in both cases involved transportation of vital international interest although the Manchurian railroads were of use only to Russia and China while the Suez Canal is vital to almost the whole international community. But the Soviet "Port Said" expedition ended in the defeat of that semi-colonial country because the Communists did not have Western qualms of conscience.

The small role played by the Eastern-European record in the anti-colonial polemics is also due to Western timidity. Our *status quo* mentality and our empirical approach to foreign relations have had certain consequences. The former places us in a defensive posture because we think principally of defending the non-Communist world against further encroachments. The



word "containment" is an eloquent expression of this state of mind. We seem to be transfixed by the idea that the tidal waves of history must roll only against the West. The latter-day military interpretation of "containment" makes us also forget that the Soviet leadership redefined its main objectives after Stalin's death. After acknowledging that the *status quo* in Europe could not be changed except at the peril of a nuclear war, they have concentrated on a gradual subversion of the existing *status quo* in the underdeveloped countries by non-military means: political, (including diplomatic,) economic, and ideological. Hence Soviet commentators readily explain peaceful co-existence as a political, economic and ideological struggle against the West. Increasing Soviet diplomatic success in these underdeveloped areas and acquisition by the U.S.S.R. of the position of a Near-Eastern power prove that this new policy has so far been crowned with obvious results. This in turn has increased our apprehension and has fortified our defensive attitude. We seem to perpetually wonder about the next Soviet offensive move and the next weakening of Western position, forgetting the great Soviet weakness; namely, discontented nationalities within the Soviet territory (40 per cent of the total Soviet population according to the latest Soviet estimates) and in the colonial areas of Eastern Europe. The relatively quick process of disintegration of Western colonial empires should, however, teach us that all multi-national structures are vulnerable. It is not easy for the U.S.S.R. to control over 95 million Eastern Europeans who have had an uninterrupted tradition (for over a thousand years) of national consciousness which makes their nationalism potentially more dynamic than that, let us say, of Africans in Ghana, Nigeria, or the Cameroons. It is true that it is not easy to devise a policy founded on this particular vulnerability of the U.S.S.R. Their claim of "liberation" was exploded by the Hungarian events and because it was impractical in a nuclear age. But should we allow the world to forget the existence of a huge Soviet colonial empire? Characteristically, Khrushchev's fury is raised to a pitch by mention of this topic, but one cannot but admire Soviet propagandist skill in stampeding a good portion of Western public opinion into supporting a summit conference

from whose agenda the Soviet government had eliminated the two embarrassing topics of German unification and of Eastern Europe, and, had added instead such items as the Near-Eastern situation where the Western powers were caught off balance.

Our empirical approach consists of tackling each event as it comes. This was an excellent method in such a relatively stabilized period, as the nineteenth century. But we live today in an epoch where three revolutions simultaneously stimulate the momentum of each other: the Leninist, the technological and the awakening of the underdeveloped areas. The Soviet concept of our time may be largely mistaken but at least it takes into account these three revolutions, the power of ideologies and of nationalism. There lies the secret of Soviet capacity for keeping the initiative in their own hands; he who is able to connect events through the common denominator of an historical concept is also able to shape these events. Yet the U.S.S.R. is not immune to perils entailed in the two potent forces of our time: the conflicts of ideologies, and the rebel nationalism, the two forces which have seemed so far to operate only to the detriment of the West. This does not need to be proved after the 1956 events in Hungary and Poland.

The traditional term "colonial protectorate," usually involved: 1. control of foreign and military affairs of the dependent territory, and 2. a greater or lesser interference with its domestic life. The most scholarly analysis of the situation in Eastern Europe certainly justifies the contention that this term applies to Soviet control over that part of the world. There is no such thing as an independent foreign policy in any East-European country, not excluding Poland, except only for timid and minor deviations since the October 1956 revolts. One of the main points of contention between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia in 1958 was the question of the independent Yugoslav foreign policy. If the Soviet leaders had accepted the Yugoslav policy of non-commitment to either bloc, there would have been no break in mutual friendly relations. Actually the Yugoslavs proved twice, in 1948 and in 1958, that nationalism is just as explosive an issue in Eastern Europe as it is anywhere else. The new Soviet-Yugoslav dispute has also thrown some revealing

light on other matters. The brutal unilateral cancellation of Soviet credits in reprisal for the Yugoslav refusal to join the "socialist camp" proves that Soviet loans have strings attached; actually, these loans have been granted only to the uncommitted nations, but the angry Soviet gestures reveal the fact that the U.S.S.R. does not tolerate any policy of non-commitment.

The two quarrels with Yugoslavia, the revolt of a number of Hungarian Communists in 1956, the dissident movement within the Polish Communist Party, and the reluctance of the present Polish Communist leaders to surrender again the domestic autonomy regained in 1956, point to an interesting fact, namely, a possible difference between the Communists who form a revolutionary opposition group in the so-called capitalist countries, on the one hand, and the Communists who have succeeded in assuming power in their respective homelands, on the other. The former are a self-isolated group hostile to their national environment and estranged from their own countrymen. They counter-balance this frustrating feeling of isolation by vicariously participating in the might of the Soviet-Chinese bloc. They can hardly revolt against the Soviet supremacy within the Communist movement for fear of ceasing to be Communists as they understand the term. Communists who have seized rule over their countrymen, impose their pattern of life on them, and are surrounded by a large group of people who have acquired in one way or another some vested interest in the regime. Their isolation is ended. They begin to run the risk of being "nationalized" in the sense of regaining emotional links with their nation. Tito demonstrated it twice; Imre Nagy and a few of his colleagues quickly made their choice in October 1956 between the Communist great power and the independence of their own country; Gomulka and the two-thirds of the Polish Central Committee, who in October 1956 ousted Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky from the Political Bureau in spite of Soviet threats and the movements of Russian troops, would have now gone as far as Tito had gone but for the unhappy Polish geographical situation. Surrounded by Soviet troops on all sides and having Soviet garrisons inside the country, they have been forced to retreat step by step to avoid a repetition of the Hungarian

tragedy. The reluctant and gradual Polish acceptance of Soviet theses on Hungary and later on Yugoslavia tangibly illustrates the fact that it is easier to challenge the Western colonial powers than the Soviet which externally and domestically tolerates only conformity and complete obedience. These examples involve only Communists while the mass of East-Europeans resent both the foreign protectorate and the Communist way of life.

Militarily the U.S.S.R. has not left a shadow of national independence. Soviet Marshal Konev is the commander-in-chief of all the satellite armies. All of them, except for Poland since the October 1956 revolt, are staffed with the Soviet "advisers" who actually occupy commanding positions. The citizens of these Soviet protectorates are then left with the function of prospective "cannon fodder," as they mainly fill the ranks of soldiers, non-commissioned, and junior officers. The whole of Eastern Europe is militarily and politically bound to the U.S.S.R. not only by the Warsaw regional treaty (the Soviet counterpart of the "aggressive" NATO) but also by a network of bilateral alliances concluded between 1943 and 1948. In case of war they are automatically committed, although the reliability of the satellite armies is, to say the least, uncertain as proved in 1956 both in Hungary and in Poland. The attempt at freeing oneself from these military ties with the "protecting" power would call, as in Hungary, for armed intervention. This "anti-colonial and peace-loving" power, which never tires of denouncing the presence of foreign troops, keeps, according to her own official statements, garrisons in Eastern Germany, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary, and there is a strong suspicion that she has air bases in Bulgaria and a naval base in Albania. The Soviet agreements concluded in 1956-57 legalized *ex post facto* the stationing of Soviet troops in the four above-mentioned countries. These troops and Soviet nuclear power guarantee the survival of the Soviet colonial empire.

The most appalling aspect of these Soviet protectorates is the imposition of foreign ways of life. The Western colonial powers never tried to displace completely the indigenous ways of life. Their Western cultural pattern was gradually interwoven with the native social fabric. This process usually resulted in the

re-awakening of national consciousness. The Soviet pattern was imported by force and imposed through the intermediacy of local Communist parties which never before had had any substantial following. This has resulted in the most serious trauma inflicted on the mentality and culture of Eastern Europe.

We should get rid of the stereotyped picture of Eastern Europe as having been a collection of "feudal" countries where the interests of large landowners were dominant, where freedom was meaningless, and where radical social thought was unknown. Only pre-war Hungary partly fits into this conventional picture, although it would be unfair to forget the Hungarian liberals, radicals, and socialists. Czechoslovakia was a working democracy. All the other countries had tried the parliamentary system and, if they failed, they had companions of misfortune in Western Europe — Italy of pre-Fascist days, the Weimar Germany, and France of the Fourth Republic. The blind copying of the defective French system, the multiplication of political parties, the lack of an uninterrupted democratic tradition, difficult domestic problems characteristic of economically semi-developed countries, and the impact of totalitarianism emanating from the neighboring powers — Germany, Italy, and Russia — all these factors contributed to the appearance of authoritarian regimes. Yet these regimes never used the Nazi technique of gas chambers or the Soviet practice of herding large sections of the population into forced labor camps. The legal and illegal activities of the democratic opposition prove that the ideals of individual freedom were very much alive in all these countries. The long tradition and vigor of such parties as the peasant and the socialist as well as the suspicion of the neighboring great power explain the fact that local Communist parties were unable to thrive on low standards of living and were insignificant, unlike France of the same pre-war days. The level of social legislation was well-advanced in most of these countries; land reforms were carried out, sometimes so thoroughly (as in Rumania) that the Communists could not add much after the war. The main political factor in those countries, the intelligentsia (not the legendary landed gentry), was fully alert to social problems. If the main problem, that of rural over-



population, could not be solved (land reforms were a measure of political appeasement but could not settle this immense social problem) by creating non-agricultural jobs in abundance, the reason was beyond the Eastern-European power of decision. Mass overseas emigration was no longer feasible and foreign private capital was unwilling to invest in an area dangerously located between the two dynamic great powers, as it is now reluctant to invest in politically unstable underdeveloped countries. The concept of governmental economic assistance was unknown at that time. All in all, it is unfair to say, as some misinformed people do, that Eastern Europe has gone from one totalitarian government to another.

The Communists completed the land reforms but, except for Hungary, did not initiate them. Moreover, there was no need for these reforms in such countries of traditionally small holdings as Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. They nationalized industries, banking, transportation, and insurance, but one should remember that a large-scale nationalization would probably have taken place under any post-war government although not to the same total extent, and not without paying attention to ensuing economic dislocations. The trend towards partial nationalization and a greater state participation in business was gathering strength before the war for reasons largely similar to those which now stimulate the same trend in the underdeveloped countries. The main branches of national economy were controlled by foreign capital and the governments were often forced into business for lack of adequate private investments. The economy of Eastern Europe, if left to itself, would probably have become a combination of state and private enterprise. Nationalization of industries is not the bone of contention.

Besides resentment of foreign control (Eastern Europe had more than her share of this control if one recalls the German, Austrian, Russian, and Turkish periods of rule) there is the vital problem of the Soviet imposition of its ways of life. Collectivization has never been popular wherever the peasant has had a long tradition of independent husbandry and an emotional attachment to his plot of land. The process of collectivization has been meeting with a stiff opposition reflected in the fall of



agricultural output. The collapse of collectivization in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland testifies to the intense dislike of this Soviet form of agricultural production which the peasant rejects as soon as he is given the choice. Control of craftsmen and small shopkeepers did not prevail as evidenced by the re-birth of crafts and retail trade in Poland after the 1956 relaxation of the Communist policy.

But there are more important problems than those dealing with the economy. Eastern Europe lived before the Soviet conquest in close contact with the Western half of the continent. One cannot possibly understand the culture of the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, and the Hungarians, if one ignores the historical fact of their having been for over a thousand years a part of Western Civilization. The other nationalities, long subject to the Byzantine influence and later to the Ottoman rule, such as the Rumanians and the Bulgarians, after regaining their independence in the nineteenth century, hastened to establish ties with Western Europe. Eastern Europe was a poor part of Europe but it *was* Europe. The present protecting power has made a great effort to cut off these traditional ties, thus undermining by implication the link between the Eastern-European present and its long historical past. There lies the main tragedy of the captive nations.

The native Communists, inspired by Soviet doctrine, have imposed the Leninist ethics which know of only one yardstick for measuring the morality of human acts, namely their usefulness to the Communist cause. The traditional morality of Eastern Europe cannot be reconciled with this subordination of the means to the end. It suffices to read the articles written in 1955-56 by the dissident Polish Communists to realize that many a Communist born in Eastern Europe might have qualms of conscience regarding this essential question of means and ends and the debasement of the individual to the level of an economic unit. One can imagine the revulsion of the non-Communists, in particular those vast numbers of sincerely believing people. Whatever opinion one may hold of the former social role of the Eastern-European Churches, there remains the fact that they were venerated by a vast majority of the population. The Soviet

drive against all Churches and religion itself is foreign-imposed and resented. The local Communists have copied the Soviet pattern of either crushing the Church, as was the case of the Catholic Church in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, or of making it the political tool of an atheistic party as has been done with the Greek-Orthodox Churches.

The formula of socialist realism meant the end of contacts with modern Western literature, the arts, and music. Socialist realism stifles Russian culture but at least it is not enforced there by order of foreigners. The unpopularity of this formula was proved during the 1955-56 period of relaxation when the Polish, Hungarian, and to a lesser degree, other Eastern-European writers, artists, and musicians could express their disapproval. The bankruptcy of socialist realism in Poland led immediately to a feverish attempt to make up for lost time and to renew knowledge of modern trends in the West. Can one, however, imagine a worse type of colonialism than one which does not allow the subject nations to choose freely not only the themes but even the form of art?

The Eastern-European intelligentsia was fond of debating all sorts of topics, political or not. The protecting power has now substituted the narrow Party line for free discussion. With the Communist monopoly of education, the printing presses, all social associations, and the media of mass information, the very access to non-conformist ideas is drastically restricted. It is true, as a Polish Communist intellectual said in 1956, that even the Communists had been unable to teach people how to unlearn the process of thinking. However, human thought fructifies only when expressed, and this is forbidden.

Assuming that these nearly one-hundred million people feel as strongly about foreign control as do the Arabs, the Indians, the Indonesians, or the Africans, has the U.S.S.R. the right to act as an apostle of anti-colonialism?

Yet Eastern Europe is half-forgotten except for short outbursts of interest caused by such tragic events as the Berlin riots, the Poznan uprising, the Hungarian revolution, and the Polish revolt. Such events are soon forgotten in an atmosphere of wishful thinking — of expecting a sudden Soviet change of

heart. Is it not in our political interest to confront Russia with her colonial record, particularly in the underdeveloped countries where she wages her anti-colonialist propaganda with no small amount of success? Is it not, moreover, our moral duty, especially to those who accept the principle of national self-determination in favor of Asians and Africans? Our untiring insistence on the Soviet record of colonialism might eventually make Asian intellectuals more sceptical of Soviet sincerity and force them to protest against every form of colonialism, including the Soviet. A sceptic could say that mere words of truth about Eastern Europe would be futile. But then why has the U.S.S.R. had so much success in manipulating *false* words?

# Soviet Literature in 1958

BY VERA ALEXANDROVA

IN HIS article "A Glance at Russian Literature in 1847" V. Belinsky remarked that, after annual surveys of literature became firmly established it would no longer be necessary to review each work separately. The main problem, he said, would then be "to show the predominant direction, the general trend of literature at a given time to bring out the thoughts which enliven and motivate it." With this quotation in mind I would like to survey Soviet literature for the year 1958.

It is hard to suppress a bitter smile when one thinks that the literature of more than one hundred years ago was so much more purposeful and clear than the Soviet literature of today! All Belinsky had to do was to determine its "predominant direction" and to bring out "the thoughts that moved and enlivened it." The possibility that the "directing" thought might not enliven and advance, but stifle and even turn back, could not have possibly arisen in his mind.

Before analyzing Soviet literature in 1958 it should be noted that there was a greater variety of topics than the year before. In 1958 the predominant trend was to expose the "revisionists," i.e. those members of the Communist Party who had taken advantage of the "thaw" after Khrushchev's speech at the secret session of the 20th Party Congress in 1956, and who wrote against the "conservatives" in the Party and fought for a softening of Party censorship of literature. After the publication of Khrushchev's article "For a Close Link of Literature and Art with the Life of the People" (September, 1957), such attempts were branded as "revisionistic," and those who defended them were regarded as highly unreliable. This is reflected in many writings of the previous year, for instance in Alexander Korneichuk's play "Why the Stars Smiled" (*Znamia*, January, 1958).

This officially sanctioned struggle is most clearly visible in the novel of Vsevolod Kochetov *The Brothers Ershov* (*Neva*,

June-July, 1958). Kochetov is not a novice in literature. His first writings appeared as early as 1946 (*On the Plains of the Neva*, *Zvezda*, 1946). The main heroes of the new novel are the "hereditary proletarians," the Ershovs. The eldest brother, Platon, is head foreman of a blast furnace shop in a big plant. His brother Dmitri and his nephew Andrei work in the same plant. Andrei's father, the third brother Ershov, was killed in the war. A fourth, Lakov, a former worker, is now manager of a local theater. The fifth brother, Stepan, returns to his home town. He had been a prisoner of war during the German occupation and had joined the Vlasov movement. After the war he served a long sentence in a concentration camp. The number of positive heroes in this novel is striking: we see the young engineer Iskra Kazakova, her husband, an artist, the manager of the Chibisov plant, the secretary of the city committee of the Communist Party, Gorbachev, and so on. There are only three villains: the ill-starred inventor Krutilich (a poor caricature of Lopatkin, the hero of Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*), Vorobeinyi, the engineer who went over to the Germans during the occupation, and the brilliant engineer, Orleantsev. Contrary to Krutilich and Vorobeinyi, Orleantsev fought bravely during the war; one doesn't quite see why he protects Krutilich and Vorobeinyi. He appears to embody the type of the "inner foe" of the Communist Party. Orleantsev succeeds not only in obtaining good jobs for his protégés at the plant, but in driving Platon Ershov out; he is also responsible for the untimely death of Gorbachev. In the end, Orleantsev is, of course, exposed. The biased speeches of the heroes of the novel, in which they castigate the "revisionists," the "shouters" and the "nihilists" who have no sense of values — did the novel much harm. The author's wrath is directed against the "freedom of art" and those who do not understand that this "freedom" is only a weapon in the hands of the Western bourgeoisie who, like the witch in the fairy tale, want to fatten them up and then devour them. Kochetov's novel earned high praise: *Izvestiya* (October 2) gave it the highest accolade, calling it "a party novel."

The novel of the young writer from the Urals, V. Ocheretin, *Salamander* (*Oktiabr*, November-December, 1958) also depicts

the life of engineers and workers. It too, has its Orleantsev—the gifted shift-engineer Ponomarev, a man with a “double bottom,” who is finally exposed.

Several short stories and novels describe the critical situation of agriculture and the disappointment of the peasants in the collective system. This crisis, which came close to catastrophe, was reflected in several novels and short stories about village life. These include the novel of Fedor Panferov *Wavering Thoughts* (*Znamia*, July-October, 1958). This work is the second part of his *Mother Volga-river* (published in *Znamia* in 1954). The new work is interesting from a purely political point of view as it discloses the reasons which forced the government to yield on some seemingly immovable attributes of the kolkhoz village. It had to give up the tractor stations as independent units and started paying the collective farmers regular wages instead, as previously, of paying them partly with produce according to their “workdays” (a rather arbitrary unit). Panferov shows in his novel that agriculture suffered mostly because of “double management” by the chairman of the collective farms and the managers of the tractor stations.

More modest in scope but deeper artistically and psychologically is Efim Dorosh's *Rainy Summer* (*Moskva*, March, 1958). It is a sequel to the *Country Diary of a Writer*, which appeared in the second collection of *Literaturnaya Moskva* for 1956. Both works are full of sincere sympathy for the collective farmers and their hard life. This sympathy is the more obvious, as the author voices quite openly his criticism of the “summer guests” — the city bosses who just drop in and begin to “teach” the collective farmers.

A *Sentimental Novel* by Vera Panova (*Novyi Mir*, October-November, 1958) deals with a different topic. It is dedicated to the childhood and early youth of the author's generation. The hero, Shura Sevast'anov, returns after thirty years to his home town on the plains of Southern Russia. His thoughts, emotions, and poignant memories fill many pages. Indeed, the author's over-sentimentality weakens the story, for life in the Soviet Union in those years was far from light and carefree.

Elena Rzhrevskaya's novel *Many Years Later* (*Novyi Mir*,



August, 1958) deserves mention. The author deals here with "the lost generation" which was also the theme of Victor Nekrasov's novel *In the Home Town* (1954). The story takes place in a small industrial city. The life of the town revolves around the huge textile factory. The aftermath of the war is felt keenly. Iula comes to visit Fedor Barulin because they had fought together at the front during the war and had become very close. But now Fedor has found his place in life; he is married and is working at the factory. Things are different with Iula; she could not settle down after the war and she is drifting, like most of the heroes in Nekrasov's novel. Although following the war Iula had studied, acquired a trade, and married, she could not become adjusted; she needed the real, deep friendship which brought people so close to one another during the war. With her renewed contact with Fedor Iula realizes that he will never leave his wife and that time cannot be turned back. She resolves her dilemma by becoming secretary to Karnaukhov, an important Party member who had, like Iula, spent the war at the front and deep down was as unsettled as she. He is highly esteemed and influential. When his affair with Iula becomes known, he is "called to order" in a public Party meeting. This treatment provokes his violent protest, similar to that of the Communist Sukhodolov in N. Pogodin's play *The Sonnet of Petrarch* (1956). Karnaukhov says: "Make me work hard, demand the fulfilment of the plan, send me any place if you think it necessary, but do not interfere in this, do not interfere . . ."

Thus Rzhetskaya's novel is interesting not only because it deals with the "lost generation," but it tells us about a man who fights for the right to live his personal life. We find in other works that the struggle for freedom in personal life is interwoven with striving for a deeper perception of the psychology of contemporaries. Fear is less strong; there is more compassion for the life and problems of the common people. This is clearly shown in Daniil Granin's novel *After the Wedding* (*Oktiabr*, July-October, 1958). He is also the author of the story *Own Opinion* (1956) which at the time of publication was sharply criticized, and Granin was suspected of "revisionist" sympathies.

*After the Wedding* takes place partly in a Leningrad factory,

partly in a tractor station in the Northern regions, during the years 1956 and 1957. The newlyweds Igor and Tonia are most happy about the tiny apartment they were allotted in Leningrad: "four thick, unpenetrating walls. They sheltered them with their stones from the gaze of strangers, they allowed them to jump, to fool around, to speak nonsense, to look into each other's eyes . . ." But their happiness was short-lived. Due to the poor state of agriculture, which was revealed by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in February, 1956, the Komsomol mobilized its members for work in tractor stations. Igor is an unwilling candidate but is finally forced to give in. Although Tonia is not a member of the Komsomol she supports him all the way. Work at the station in the region of Korkino is hard: the collective farms are not only lagging behind, they are destitute; in winter they feed the cattle straw torn from the roofs of the barns. Yet when they ultimately revisit Leningrad and Igor finds he could return to his former work at the plant, he passes up the opportunity. Looking at the elegant display windows in the stores Igor burns with "youthful pride of dedication." The reader is moved by the sincerity of Igor and Tonia, and the new friends with whom they work in the province.

The more one tries to summarize the literary achievement of the past year, the more one feels the aptness of Boris Pasternak's thought in his *Doctor Zhivago*:

Although victory has not brought the relief and freedom that were expected at the end of the war, nevertheless the portents of freedom filled the air throughout the postwar period, and they alone defined its historical content.

# Khrushchev: A Political Profile

## III

BY WILLIAM K. MEDLIN

THE appointment of N. S. Khrushchev in January 1938 as Party leader in Ukraine<sup>1</sup> placed under his immediate command the major forge and granary of the Soviet Union, and its southern and western flank. The sudden switch from Moscow to Kiev was characteristic of Stalin's rule, whereby he sent loyal subordinates in to govern administrative areas without regard for principles of local political succession or of seniority of regional leaders. The appointment also was evidently instrumental for ushering in a sharp change in Bolshevik policy with respect to leadership purge, and for mustering new energies to meet basic economic and social problems. The tremendous importance of Ukraine to Soviet agricultural and industrial policies together with Ukrainian nationalist aspirations had a great impact on Khrushchev's political thinking.

His departure from Moscow had, of course, closed a vitally important chapter in his career. It meant losing the many advantages of being at the political center and that the organization which he built up personally since the early 1930's would pass to the hands of new bosses, responsible to other top leaders.<sup>2</sup> Men picked by Khrushchev as possible successors, like D. S. Korotchenko and S. Z. Korytnyi (who had once served with Khrushchev in Kiev),<sup>3</sup> were removed from Moscow assignments, most likely under pressure from top leaders who anticipated Khrushchev's transfer.

<sup>1</sup>*Vecherniaia Moskva*, January 29, 1938.

<sup>2</sup>A. I. Ugarov, formerly posted in Leningrad, became Moscow First Secretary in early April. *Visti*, April 5, 1938. Later that year A. S. Shcherbakov replaced him; during the war Shcherbakov became a powerful figure, but death halted his vigorous career in 1945.

<sup>3</sup>*Vecherniaia Moskva*, July 4, 1936.

The Ukrainian political organization was then perhaps second only in importance to Moscow's, and it offered ripe opportunities to an organizer like Khrushchev. One of the major Party measures that he had to implement was a decree of the Central Committee in Moscow: "On Mistakes by Party Organizations in Excluding Communists from the Party."<sup>4</sup> Coming toward the close of the purge period, this decision provided him and his associates with a chance to present a new leadership posture to the Ukrainian public. It meant that recently deposed leaders, like Stanislav Kosior<sup>5</sup> and Pavel Postyshev, along with many of their trusted aides, were stigmatized with having administered the "old" policy of purge and terror which had led to many perversions of justice. The Soviet press accused the Kiev Party leaders of having allowed excesses which could no longer be tolerated. Psychologically, a new and more wholesome political atmosphere was in the making in early 1938, but its herald was of Russian, not Ukrainian stock.

*Building and operating the Machine.* The Party and governmental framework which had been fashioned over the years, first by Kaganovich (1925-28) and then by Kosior (1928-1938), remained essentially the same under Khrushchev's management. Of cardinal importance, however, is the pattern of authority which Khrushchev developed for himself as well as the staff reorganizations within the old framework — some new wine was put in the old bottle, and it did not break. In addition to holding the post of Ukrainian Party First Secretary, he held seats in the Politburo and Orgburo (organizational bureau) of the Ukrainian Central Committee, forming a triple chairmanship over all three ruling bodies. He also sat in the Ukrainian legislature's Presidium, where policies became law. In April 1938, Khrushchev took charge of the Kiev Party Committees (city and oblast) as their first secretary.<sup>6</sup> This position afforded

<sup>4</sup>*ibid.*, January 19, 1938.

<sup>5</sup>Kosior, for 10 years Ukrainian General Secretary and a member of the Politburo in Moscow, and Postyshev, Ukrainian Second Secretary and a candidate to the Politburo, were both removed from their high posts and assigned other work, later to disappear and ultimately to be shot.

<sup>6</sup>*Visti*, April 18, 1938.

opportunities to develop controls and personnel through the Kiev apparatus, close at hand.

Khrushchev brought with him former Moscow associates to occupy certain key posts. Demian Korotchenko became head of government as Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of People's Commissars.<sup>7</sup> Zinovii T. Serdiuk became a Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee.<sup>8</sup> Sitting with him on the Politburo, Khrushchev had (besides Korotchenko), Burmistenko, Timoshenko, Uspensky, and (for a few months only) Shcherbakov.<sup>9</sup> S. M. Timoshenko was Commander of the Kiev Military District, and Burmistenko held the post of Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Party under Khrushchev. Other notables who became chief aides were M. S. Grechukha, as Chief of State (chairman of the legislature's presidium); I. A. Serov (commissar of the NKVD); D. Z. Manuilsky (a high official in the Comintern); and young careerists such as Korniets, M. S. Spivak, Gaevoi, A. F. Fedorov, Tkach, Begma, Korneichuk, Strokach, and others.<sup>10</sup> These men were marked to carry many of the political burdens in years ahead, and their political survival to this day attests to the viability of Khrushchev's organizational work early in his Ukrainian tour of duty.

By the time the 18th All-Union Party Congress convened at Moscow in March, 1939, Khrushchev had demonstrated that he was capable of exercising responsible control over the huge fief that was Ukraine. Accordingly, he advanced to full membership in the Politburo, bypassing a number of old colleagues such

<sup>7</sup>*ibid.*, February 22, 1938. He had served with Khrushchev in 1934 and advanced to important Moscow posts. *Pravda*, January 22, 1934; *Vech. Moskva*, June 16, 1938.

<sup>8</sup>*Visti*, April 28, 1938.

<sup>9</sup>*Pravda*, June 19, 1938. At the time Shcherbakov was Secretary of the strong Stalino Party Committee.

<sup>10</sup>*Visti*, February 23, 1938; *Kolgospnik Ukraini*, May 15, 1940; *Komunist*, February 6, 1941 and March 18, 1941; and other issues of the Ukrainian press. Timoshenko later gave up his command to G. K. Zhukov; and Serov went on to Moscow posts, being replaced in Ukraine by V. T. Sergienko and P. Ya. Meshik. *Komunist*, March 13, 1941. As of 1956-57, nearly all of Khrushchev's subordinate leaders from the 1938-41 period were still active in Soviet affairs, according to Soviet press listings. See *Soviet Political Leaders* (External Research Staff, U. S. Dept. of State, 1957).

such as Bulganin and Malenkov.<sup>11</sup> Albeit as junior member, Khrushchev figured as one of the eight men who ruled the vast Soviet Union with Stalin (Andreev, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Mikoyan, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Zhadnov.<sup>12</sup>) Perhaps the word "ruled" is inappropriate: by 1939, after the Stalinist purges had stricken life out of all political aspirants but those who agreed docilely to follow the Kremlin master, and after Stalin had installed his fellow Georgian L. P. Beria as chief of the NKVD, it is doubtful indeed that even the Politburo members exercised any real initiative.<sup>13</sup> The promotion was in keeping with tradition and reflected the political importance of the large Ukrainian Party delegation which Khrushchev headed at the 18th Party Congress. That group of delegates comprised over 17% of the total voting delegates and was the largest single Party group at the Congress. Together with the Moscow organization, it accounted for 31% of the total votes, and, adding the Leningrad delegation, we arrive at 40%.<sup>14</sup> Briefly but vividly, these figures illustrate the key position which Nikita Khrushchev occupied in Party organization.

As a manager and administrator, Khrushchev was well-nigh ubiquitous, visiting a collective farm in Kiev oblast, a mine in the Donbass, or the construction of a new school at Sumy. Ukraine had often been the scene of new economic or social experiments, especially in agriculture. It was there that the collective farm was initiated, and industrial organization and techniques applied in Ukraine served often as patterns elsewhere in the Soviet Union. In keeping with this tradition, Khrushchev pushed some of his own experimental ideas, like the growing of corn as a fodder base.<sup>15</sup> His ideas were not, however, put to wide use. Another project was a model collective farm settlement at Lomovate.<sup>16</sup> He promised the peasants better things, insisting that greater agricultural production would mean more

<sup>11</sup>Recruitment figures are in *Pravda*, May 18, 1940.

<sup>12</sup>*Pravda*, March 23, 1939.

<sup>13</sup>Stalin's manner (ignoring seniority) of assigning responsibilities during the 1941-45 war years is perhaps the clearest sign of this.

<sup>14</sup>XVIII Sezd VKP(b) . . . *Stenograficheski otchet* Moscow, 1939, p. 146.

<sup>15</sup>*Komunist*, March 11, 1941.

<sup>16</sup>*ibid.*, February 6, 1941.



kolkhoz revenue and he sponsored a new law, "On Additional Pay for Work of Collective Farmers Increasing Harvest Yields of Agricultural Crops and Productivity of Livestock Breeding."<sup>17</sup>

Just as he had done at Moscow, Khrushchev made himself popularly known with his outgoing manner, mixing with the people, asking about their problems, promising corrective measures, offering a better future, etc. At the same time, his loyalty to Moscow was epitomized in the brief descriptive title: "a true disciple of the great Stalin."<sup>18</sup> In his major public addresses, Khrushchev discussed mainly the problems of industrial and agricultural development. Characteristic of his boastful confidence in Soviet management is this remark made at a political meeting in June, 1938: "I know how the Donbass developed and grew. In the last 10 years in the Donbass, as much has been done as could not be done under capitalism in 100 years."<sup>19</sup> In line with Moscow's policy of increasing emphasis on things Russian, Khrushchev pushed for more teaching of the Russian language, which during the 1920's and 1930's had not been as popular as French, German, and Polish.<sup>20</sup> Thereafter it became part of the regular curriculum. Warning Ukrainians about flirting with separatist aspirations on Ukraine's western borders, he pointed his finger at nationalist groups in Carpathian Rus (Ruthenia) who, he claimed, sought to plant their "dirty boots . . . on the holy socialist soil of free Soviet Ukraine."<sup>21</sup> These were the general tones of Khrushchev's Ukrainian rule.

*The War Years.* The march of boots was in fact not long in coming, but at first they were Soviet boots marching westward. To implement the incorporation into Soviet Ukraine of ethnic Ukrainian lands in Poland following the joint Nazi-Soviet occupation of Poland in September 1939, Soviet troops were dispatched to maintain order. Khrushchev led a Ukrainian delegation to Lvov and Eastern Galicia "to welcome" the Polish Ukrainians and other minorities into the Soviet Republic. One

<sup>17</sup>*Moscow News*, February 18, 1941.

<sup>18</sup>*Komunist*, March 12, 1941.

<sup>19</sup>*Pravda*, June 9, 1938.

<sup>20</sup>*ibid.*, June 16, 1938.

<sup>21</sup>*ibid.*, March 15, 1939.

of the delegation's duties was, of course, to oversee the preparation of the election lists for the new "people's assemblies" that were to vote for incorporation.<sup>22</sup> From that time forward, Khrushchev was closely identified with a policy of greater Soviet Ukraine.

During the first days of the lightning German attack on the U.S.S.R. beginning on June 22, 1941, Khrushchev was absent from Kiev, presumably participating in major political and military councils in Moscow.<sup>23</sup> As a member of the Military Council of the Kiev District, he was directly involved in planning and organizing defensive operations as well as economic mobilization and evacuation. Under his command, the dismantling and shipment east and north of vital industrial equipment were carried out, and he was dubbed "technician of war."<sup>24</sup> He was ordered by the Central Committee in Moscow "to military work,"<sup>25</sup> as were N. A. Bulganin, A. A. Zhdanov, and A. S. Shcherbakov. Although this military investiture was vitally important to a regional leader like Khrushchev, it did not equal the power granted by Stalin to others who formed the State Defense Committee (Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Beria).

While the Ukrainian government moved to Ufa, in the Bashkir Republic, Khrushchev served on the Military Council of the South-Western Front,<sup>26</sup> commanded by his old colleague, Marshal Timoshenko. He took charge of all Ukrainian partisan operations behind German lines and was Chief of the Ukrainian Staff, and member of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. The Central Staff, commanded by Marshal Voroshilov, was attached to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command

<sup>22</sup>Cf C. A. Manning, *Ukraine under the Soviets*, 1953, pp. 151-53.

<sup>23</sup>Soviet press for June 23-30, 1941, on Kiev meetings. See also the detailed study of Ukrainian affairs by J. A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945*, 1955.

<sup>24</sup>*Journal de Genève*, February 14, 1955. A Rumanian army officer who took part in operations against Ukraine stated that evacuations had been efficient and showed much organizational skill.

<sup>25</sup>P. A. Zhilin, *Vazhneishie operatsii Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voyny*, 5th ed., Moscow, 1956, p. 23.

<sup>26</sup>*ibid*, p. 102.

under Stalin.<sup>27</sup> Khrushchev served continually with the military council, which assumed different names (Kursk, Voronezh, Stalingrad, First Ukrainian) as the war developed. In November 1941, he was posted at Voronezh.<sup>28</sup> For a time in 1942 and early 1943, he also had charge of the Partisan Organization of the Stalingrad Front, still subordinate to Voroshilov. His dual political-military offices gave him wide powers and enabled him to retain control over the Ukrainian Party network, which continued to function underground, and over the conduct of partisan military operations in the German rear.

All during the Stalingrad offensive Khrushchev was on the scene, directing the evacuation of civilians, industrial goods, supplies and livestock.<sup>29</sup> From headquarters at Kalacha-on-Don, he also helped direct defensive operations, working through the key Party organs at local levels in order to manage support for military activities.<sup>30</sup> The coordination of all operations at Stalingrad was entrusted to Malenkov, representing Stalin's State Defense Committee.<sup>31</sup> Although he was not, like Khrushchev, a full member of the Politburo, Malenkov functioned in that capacity as Khrushchev's superior.

Perhaps his most important activity during the war, as far as his own political future was concerned, was Khrushchev's direction of the underground Party organizations in Ukraine. Political and military administration was carried out by his loyal and close associates, most of whom he had picked as staff men long before the war. These connections enabled him to maintain control over the Ukrainian Communist Party, even during the most bitter months of the war.<sup>32</sup> His veteran colleague, Demian Korotchenko, who served during the war first as Secretary and later as Second Secretary, replacing the defected Burmistenko,<sup>33</sup>

<sup>27</sup>Vodolagin, M. A. *Stalingrad v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine*, Stalin-grad, 1949, p. 62.

<sup>28</sup>*Pravda*, November 7, 1941. Polish Communist Wanda Wasilewska and her Ukrainian husband, A. Korneichuk, were there with Khrushchev.

<sup>29</sup>Khrushchev has advertised the fact that he "was there." See Marshall MacDuffie, *The Red Carpet*, 1953, p. 198.

<sup>30</sup>Vodolagin, *op. cit.*, pp. 132, 174; Zhilin, *op. cit.*, pp. 116 ff.

<sup>31</sup>Zhilin, *loc. cit.*

<sup>32</sup>*Komunist*, April 19, 1942.

<sup>33</sup>M. A. Burmistenko defected to the Germans.

was Khrushchev's chief commissar for partisan matters. Known to partisans as "Comrade Demian," Korotchenko made many trips behind German lines to check on and give instructions to partisan leaders like General Sidor Kovpak.<sup>34</sup> Other key men serving Khrushchev were V. A. Begma (a Party Secretary in charge of political affairs in the western regions around Rovno), A. F. Fedorov (another career Secretary with regional powers), Z. T. Serdiuk (Kiev Party Secretary, and one of the closest collaborators of Khrushchev), T. A. Strokach (a general in the NKVD who worked closely with Korotchenko and Khrushchev, and who had made the first effort to organize Soviet partisans in the fall of 1941), K. Z. Litvin (Ukrainian Party propaganda chief), and M. S. Spivak (cadres Secretary for the Ukrainian Party, a vital post linked with all political organization work.)<sup>35</sup> All these leaders are still active in Soviet political affairs — a fact demonstrating Khrushchev's sustained political influence covering a decade and a half. They were his chief wartime political lieutenants, and he depended on them for a thorough knowledge of internal conditions, developments, and people during the occupation period. They served him well, and he bestowed honors on them.<sup>36</sup>

Khrushchev's status as a military commissar was formalized in February, 1943, when he, together with Zhdanov, received the military rank of Lieutenant General of the Army.<sup>37</sup> Armed with this and many other instruments of power, he reappeared in his capital, Kiev, on November 6, 1943, the eve of the 26th anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power. Reporting to Stalin on the Ukrainian victory, Khrushchev acknowledged him as the liberator of Ukrainians: "The residents of Kiev asked me personally to convey to you their deepest and heartfelt

<sup>34</sup>P. P. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovestiu*, Moscow, 1953, 2 vols., esp. vol. 2, pp. 48, 96-98, 400-401.

<sup>35</sup>D. N. Medvedev, *Silnye dukhom*, Moscow, 1951, p. 391; Vershigora, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 404, and vol. 2, pp. 325, 346-47, 359, 363-64, 402, 405-412; *Pravda*, May 2, 1942; *Komunist*, May 1, 1942; T. A. Strokach, *Partizani Ukraini*, Moscow, 1943; *Partiinoe stroitelstvo*, No. 9-10, 1943, p. 23.

<sup>36</sup>Vershigora, vol. 2, p. 396.

<sup>37</sup>*Pravda*, February 13, 1943.

gratitude for the liberation of their native city."<sup>38</sup> The return of Soviet rule opened a new chapter in his career.

*Postwar Troubles and Recovery.* Khrushchev emerged from the war with tighter personal controls — with more powers concentrated in him alone — than he had had at the beginning of the war. These are the offices which he occupied: First Secretary, and member of the Politburo and Orgburo, of the Ukrainian Central Committee; Chairman (premier) of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars;<sup>39</sup> First Secretary of the Kiev Oblast and City Party Committees; member of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet; Lt. General of the Army, member of the Military Council, and Commander of Partisan Forces; and, of course, member of the central Politburo in Moscow. His position in Ukraine imaged in a large measure that of Stalin in the U.S.S.R. as a whole.

In 1944-45 Khrushchev set about reestablishing his authority by visiting every possible local area.<sup>40</sup> He warned against nationalist tendencies in certain areas and circles. Badly shaken and compromised during the Nazi-Soviet conflict, the pattern of Russian controls was reinstated with great difficulty. Although Soviet propaganda had encouraged feelings of Ukrainian cultural traditions and nationhood, from 1944 official policy strived to curb them. But under Khrushchev's management many local political leaders inspired by those popular sentiments succeeded in obtaining and retaining responsible posts. The problem of control became so great that by 1946 Khrushchev's rule seemed threatened, and a strong warning decree by the Central Committee in Moscow called for redressing Ukrainian affairs. In response, Khrushchev announced a new Party policy on personnel recruitment and promotion.<sup>41</sup> He was obliged to accuse his local bosses of filling posts with poorly qualified persons, "politically and technically," especially in the Western areas, and to uncover "bourgeois nationalism" in literature and histori-

<sup>38</sup>*Moscow News*, November 10, 1943.

<sup>39</sup>He replaced young Korniets in that post in February, 1944.

<sup>40</sup>Note references to his wide travelling about the country, in *Partiinoe stroitelstvo*, No. 10, 1944, p. 20.

<sup>41</sup>*Pravda*, August 23, 1946.



cal works. Rebel partisan bands in Western Ukraine had in fact caused more than incidental damage to Soviet establishments and military forces.<sup>42</sup> He instituted a vast turnover of personnel at local levels, with numerous arrests and deportations. It is well to recall that both during and after the war, Khrushchev's veteran lieutenants continued to rule in Ukraine, and it seems evident that the local disturbances and pressure directed from high circles in Moscow were working to dislodge Khrushchev and his ruling group from power.

He did not succeed in handling the situation to Moscow's satisfaction, and the threat to his position in the Party leadership grew serious. Stalin and the Politburo decided to relieve him as Ukrainian First Secretary and appointed L. M. Kaganovich to that post in March, 1947.<sup>43</sup> Although Kaganovich appears to have come to help bolster Khrushchev's rule, "to strengthen Party and Soviet work," the event was marked by more complicated changes. Khrushchev had to (or chose to?) relinquish his two secretarial posts in the Kiev Party organization, which came under the control of Serdiuk. Furthermore, a completely new face in Ukrainian politics, N. S. Patolichev, came in to share the duties of Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee with Korotchenko. Patolichev had served in the Russian Party organization and in the central organs, under Malenkov. Khrushchev himself retained only the position of premier, and seems to have been conspicuously inactive in that office during the rest of 1947.

While bringing about a partial eclipse of Khrushchev, these developments did not end in his disgrace or removal from the Moscow Politburo. He was able to resume command of the Ukrainian Party in December 1947, when Kaganovich returned to duties in Moscow, and turned over the premiership to Korotchenko.<sup>44</sup> The changes created a visible separation of Party-Government offices and a return to "normalcy" in institutional

<sup>42</sup>Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-79.

<sup>43</sup>*Pravda*, March 5, 1947.

<sup>44</sup>*Pravda*, December 28, 1947.



relationships.<sup>45</sup> This separation concept later became a political instrument used by Khrushchev to his own advantage in national politics. To serve as his Second Secretary (and later successor), Khrushchev brought up L. G. Melnikov from Stalino, where he had been Party boss for several years.<sup>46</sup> The fact that Khrushchev not only did not fade away as a political figure but actually came back strongly as a Party leader testifies to support of loyal subordinates in Ukraine, his hard core of career followers first built up during 1938-40. This support is of no little significance in understanding Khrushchev's political career up to the present time. During 1948-49 he reconsolidated his rule in Ukraine and brought new persons into positions of leadership.

*Return to Moscow and Rise to Power.* By late 1949 Khrushchev had commanded a loyal group of party organizers over a longer period of time (in Moscow and Ukraine), than had any other member of Stalin's ruling circle. In December, 1949, he was called to take charge once more of the Moscow Party Committee and to serve on the Secretariat of the Central Committee, where he would operate under Stalin and side by side with Malenkov, Suslov, and Ponomarenko. This provided Khrushchev with the opportunity for the first time to perform personnel-organization work on a national scale.

The reason for this sudden elevation was the dismissal of Georgi M. Popov from his posts of Moscow Party Secretary, CPSU Secretary, and member of the Orgburo.<sup>47</sup> The reasons for this major change in the top Soviet leadership are mostly obscure but the all-important factors are evident, at least to this observer, and are linked to a primary axiom of Stalinist Party policy: maintenance of a balance of political forces resident in the major regional organizations of the Communist Party. Since the composition of the Party's supreme bodies (especially the

<sup>45</sup>This return to "normalcy" in Party-State relations also occurred in Belorussia, where Ponomarenko had ruled over both; but Stalin continued to occupy the supreme offices in both. In 1948 Ponomarenko went to Moscow to become a Secretary of the Central Committee. *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, 2nd ed., vol. 34, p. 142.

<sup>46</sup>*Partiinoye stroitelstvo*, No. 10, 1944, p. 27.

<sup>47</sup>*Pravda*, December 18, 1949.

Secretariat, charged with current organizational-cadres work) tended to reflect the arrangement of regional political forces, any change in those bodies must be related, though not exclusively so, to regional leaderships and loyalties. Fundamental to the political balance were the three large regional organizations: Moscow, Ukraine, and Leningrad, which collectively accounted for about 40% of the Party Congress membership (which in turn elected the Central Committee). As long as Stalin maintained a two- or three-way division of controls over these three bastions, his task of governing by exercising other forces was facilitated. It seems likely, if not probable, that during 1949 that balance was upset in favor of Malenkov.<sup>48</sup>

Secretary General Stalin, who had long since ceased to engage in regional organization work, had always prevented the key organizations from falling under the predominant influence of a single political faction which might succeed in opposing him. It is in this context that Khrushchev's return to power in Moscow appears politically intelligible. As the only other leading Party official who enjoyed substantial regional Party strength, Khrushchev functioned as a balancing weight in the Communist Party organization. In addition to his Moscow post, he received duties in the fields of Party administration and agriculture.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>48</sup>The death in 1948 of CPSU Secretary Zhdanov, longtime Party head in Leningrad, followed by the removal in 1949 of his Leningrad successor A. A. Kuznetsov (also CPSU Secretary), left critical vacancies at the power center and in Leningrad. These were filled by men who, it seems, stood closer to or were more indebted to Malenkov (Cadres Secretary for Stalin, 1939-1946?) than to any other leader. They were Ponomarenko and V. M. Andrianov, both Party cadres specialists. A Malenkov-Popov relationship suggests itself by virtue of Popov's very removal from power, by the fact that Malenkov favored him by naming Popov Ambassador to Poland in 1953, and by Malenkov's long but obscure connections with the Moscow Party organization. Khrushchev's references to violations of Party legality in Leningrad, even if only partly accurate, would logically be related to Andrianov's take-over there in 1949. *Pravda*, Jan. 26, 1945, April 7, 1949, June 21, 1953, and July 7, 1957; *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, No. 13-14, 1943, p. 9. *The Crimes of the Stalin Era*, Special Report . . . by Khrushchev, N.Y., The New Leader, 1956, pp. 46, 61n.

<sup>49</sup>At the XIX Party Congress in October, 1952, Khrushchev reported on major changes in Party organization and administration. *Pravda*, October 13, 1952. On agricultural matters, see his February 1950 election speech, discussions in *Izvestiia*, August 26, 1950, and *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 11, 1950.

He advocated extensive reorganization of the agricultural economy, similar to experiments worked out in Ukraine whereby completely new rural settlements (*agrogorods*) would be established. His efforts were definitely blocked after 1950, however, and he did not resume them until after Stalin's death. In the Moscow organization hardly a handful of those who had served under Popov in 1949 remained by 1952 and Khrushchev initiated many changes.

It seems, on the basis of the records available to us in official Soviet statements, that a political *status quo* had been reached upon Khrushchev's return to Moscow in December 1949. No change in composition of the top Party organs occurred until the 19th CPSU Congress in October 1952, when a substantial reshuffling of the leadership took place and Stalin lost his eminent post of Secretary General of the Party, to become one, albeit senior in rank, of the eight Secretaries elected.<sup>50</sup> New tensions entered Soviet politics. Khrushchev's activities seemed restricted, and at the Congress it was decided that the Moscow Committee would no longer share with the Central Committee control over the Party newspaper *Pravda*. And that paper ceased to list the political rankings of the Politburo (renamed Presidium at the Congress, on motion by Khrushchev); obscurity and fear confused the whole political scene for the observer.

Once the old dictator was no more, however, the younger leaders were able to exercise their initiative. During 1953, we can see the reserves of Khrushchev's power begin to work, and we find him jockeying for position to assert himself. As early as March he assumed the leading role in the Secretariat and in directing the Central Committee's work, displacing Malenkov.<sup>51</sup> Through an agreement on collective leadership and a separation of Party and State offices, a certain stability in the regime was reached, especially after Beria's expulsion. While Malenkov headed the government, Khrushchev administered the Party and was confirmed in that function as First Secretary of the

<sup>50</sup>*Pravda*, October 17, 1952; *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, vol. 3, Moscow, 1955, p. 310.

<sup>51</sup>*Pravda*, March 7, 11, and 21, 1953. Khrushchev lost control of the Moscow organization at this time, but he replaced Malenkov as leader in the Central Committee's Secretariat.

Central Committee in September.<sup>52</sup> At the time of the October 1952 Congress, Khrushchev ranked eighth in the regime; upon Stalin's death in March 1953, he was fifth; and by September of that year he was third, after Malenkov and Molotov. In 1954 rank listings ceased, replaced by alphabetical sequence. By 1955, Khrushchev's emergence was a fact.

This political rise after Stalin's demise could not have been based only on ambition, artifice, or chance: we must look for firm foundations. The only ones Khrushchev had were the Ukrainian and Moscow Party organizations, and it is clear that in 1953 new attempts were made to destroy his power in those areas. He had to give up direction of Moscow to N. A. Mikhailov (former youth leader) after Stalin's passing. Within a year, however, Mikhailov gave way to other leaders (Kapitonov and Furtseva) who had been elevated in the Moscow committees by Khrushchev after 1949.<sup>53</sup> In Ukraine, the second major effort in seven years to undermine Khrushchev's influence occurred in June 1953, when Melnikov was ousted on charges similar to those levelled at Khrushchev in 1946.<sup>54</sup> But like the Moscow Party, Ukrainian political affairs remained essentially in the hands of longtime co-workers of Khrushchev. Leaders in both Moscow and Ukraine became, in time, leaders at the national level as well: Kirichenko, Furtseva, Brezhnev, Matskevich, etc.<sup>55</sup> The fruits of patronage multiplied.

By seizing one initiative or issue after another, through his knowledge of people — knowledge born of long experience working among the rank and file and in various Party echelons —, and by a seemingly uncanny notion of the right psychological moment for a decisive political maneuver, Khrushchev proved on the various stages of Soviet politics at home and abroad that his skills and powers as a politician could fence off his old Politburo colleagues from the one-way street of Communist Party politics. Beyond the fences lay political dereliction.

*(To be continued)*

<sup>52</sup>*ibid.*, September 13, 1953.

<sup>53</sup>*ibid.*, February 1, 1954.

<sup>54</sup>*Pravda Ukraina*, June 13, 1953.

<sup>55</sup>A list of Khrushchev's longtime associates will appear in the next article in this series.

## Book Reviews

DALLIN, ALEXANDER. *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1957. 695 pp. \$10.00.

Alexander Dallin has done a masterful job of carefully screening and organizing the vast resources of the German archives and other materials to present a fascinating picture of this major aspect of Hitler's drive for world conquest.

Dallin indicates the great opportunity Nazi Germany had of exploiting the tensions and unrest among the Soviet population under Stalin. But the voices of those who recognized this potential, men like Gustav Hilger and Claus von Stauffenberg, remained small, unheeded sounds until the German cause had become desperate. By this time the true aims and practices of the Reich were understood by the Soviet masses, and propaganda appeals fell on deaf ears.

The Slavs occupied a position on Hitler's "ethnic scale of values" above that of races to be exterminated, but beneath that of a people qualified for cultural indoctrination. Hitler envisioned the Soviet populus as an agrarian community, to be re-settled east of the Urals, while European Russia would be colonized by Germans. His low regard for the Slavs convinced the Führer that conquest of the U.S.S.R. would be quick, and therefore any attempts at seeking collaboration from the bulk of the population against the "Jews and Bolsheviks" was neither necessary nor desirable.

As late as October, 1943, Himmler declared: "For us the end of the war will mean an open road to the East . . . We shall move the limits of German settlement eastwards by 500 kilometres . . . into an area militarily secured for our grandchildren and great-grandchildren." (p. 280)

From this curious logic evolved the S. S. branding of the Russians as "Untermensch," or subhuman. As Dallin notes, to the Nazis the Soviets were robots, "soulless men, machine-like tools, handymen of Stalin and the Soviet Jews." (p 72) This could only lead to abusive treatment of prisoners, and word of this soon filtered down throughout the population.

Another reflection of this was the occupation policy of closing down all school facilities above the fourth grade. The Reich deemed it foolish to educate the "Untermensch," when the only consequence could be enlightened reaction against the conquerors. This closed another door on utilization of potential indigenous forces against the Kremlin. The intelligentsia had been thwarted.

At every turn, both German policy and practice were antagonistic. Hitler appeared content to let the bureaucratic forces in Berlin quarrel over the occupation spoils. The Army desired manpower for support and service duties, while German industry clamored for Soviet labor. At first, Hitler refused to allow Russians on German soil, but



as domestic resources dwindled first voluntary, then forced labor was brought in. The Soviet peasant's hatred for the kolkhoz system was ignored because German economists recognized, as had the Kremlin, that this system provided the easiest means of collecting agricultural commodities.

The cream of Nazi administrators was already engaged in occupation duties in western Europe. The bulk of those dispatched East were second-rate, untrained men, who saw in the Soviet Union an opportunity to build up personal empires. The most notorious was Erich Koch, Reichkommissar of Ukraine. The fate of the Ukrainians is summed up in Koch's declaration that "the very last must be extracted from the civilian population without regard for their welfare." (p. 143)

Dallin's volume is filled with portraits of men like Koch; Martin Bormann, whose Machiavellian tactics aimed at driving a wedge between Hitler and any who would usurp his own influence with the Führer; Alfred Rosenberg, the ineffectual, spineless dreamer entrusted with the Ostministerium; and others who played leading roles during the years of occupation. There is also told the disheartening story of General Andrei Vlasov, and the attempt to use him in the belated quest for support of the Soviet peoples against the Kremlin.

As Dallin concludes, the occupation was a complete failure. Economically, the occupied U.S.S.R. provided only one-seventh the volume of goods that the Reich obtained from France. Politically, German practices drove the Soviet populace back into the arms of the

Kremlin, and by 1943 the U.S.S.R. was a determined and united force in fulfilling the single aim of driving Germany off Soviet soil. And militarily, Germany lost huge numbers of men in the period after Stalingrad, after enjoying such easy success during the early period of the war.

One can only speculate as to the situation that would have arisen in the event of a true German policy of liberation in June 1941. But such a policy violated all of Hitler's concepts, for he never could regard the Slavs as meriting such considerations.

A word must be added here commending the author for the excellent charts and maps. Complete documentation and careful citation furnish an excellent basis for further study by the reader.

RICHARD D. NEWELL  
Syracuse, New York

SCOTT, DEREK J. R. *Russian Political Institutions*. New York, Rinehart & Co., 1958. 265 pp. \$4.00.

The student who plows through the small print of this meaty little text will find it in some respects a gratifying experience. It is a useful and thorough treatment of the institutional structure of Soviet politics. Wisely, Mr. Scott anchored his analysis on a survey of Russian political institutions before the Soviet period, pointing out the weakness of the legislative and judicial branches of the government, the tradition of arbitrary administrative rule, as well as sketching the emergence of a revolutionary challenge imbued with single-minded ideological fervor. A student tackling for the first time the complex patterns of Soviet politics will



doubtless derive a much keener appreciation of their character and their relevance to the Russian tradition by reading this important introductory section.

The next two major sections are devoted to a descriptive evaluation of the institutions of the Soviet state. They provide us with a particularly useful treatment of the organization and operation of Soviet administration. Indeed, it is in Mr. Scott's treatment of the administrative institutions, their internal structure, the nature of their decisions, instructions, orders, decrees, and dispositions (as well as the differences between them), and the organization of local government that the major strength of this volume is to be sought. Subsequent sections deal with the Party, patterns of management and decision-making.

The book is not without its defects. In approaching his subject Mr. Scott stated that he "rests on the assumption that a judgment is acceptable only in so far as its standards are Russian, a reasonable estimate of what Russians, in Russian circumstances would find more or less satisfactory" (p. 18). This immediately raises some major difficulties. First of all, one cannot be quite certain, even considering Russian political traditions, what current "Russian standards" are and what exactly is meant by them. Is it the standard of the population as a whole, or of its ruling elite, and how does one guess what it now is? As a result Mr. Scott's book in effect evades the problem of evaluation and views Soviet political institutions from a perspective which might be described as "nominalist." A political scientist possibly should avoid making so-called "value"

judgments but if we are concerned only with opinion of the parties directly involved, what judgment would we have to make, let us say, of the institutions of the Fascist dictatorships? Furthermore, and probably because of this effort to approach the problem from the standpoint of the Russian context, the role of terror is not mentioned at all, while the secret police appears in the major section on "The Web of Management" only as a minor subsection of the part entitled "Organs of Detection and Regulation" and is given a one-page treatment, roughly as much as that given to the banking system which also appears as a subsection. (Armed Forces, Education, etc., are discussed in full sections). One might argue that terror has disappeared together with Stalinism but in a volume which stresses both the existing institutions and the patterns of their development, the social and political function of terror seems to deserve some consideration. This brings us to the final criticism. The dynamic, revolutionary quality of the Soviet system, particularly in terms of the role of the Party in reshaping Russian society, does not emerge from the book. The emphasis is rather on the operative pattern of the political institutions, their organization and methods. Possibly that was Mr. Scott's intent and, certainly, if such was the case, he succeeded very well.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

*Harvard University*

BRANDT, CONRAD. *Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958. 226 pp. \$4.75.

Several authors have dealt with the Soviet effort to promote revolutionary explosions in China by working with Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang and the failure that resulted. The volume under review, however, approaches the problem in a new dimension, as, in addition to the sources in Russian, German and French, Dr. Brandt has also used materials in Far Eastern languages that tell the Chinese side of the story. Thanks to his familiarity with the Chinese scene as well as the Soviet aspect, he has succeeded in unravelling the extraordinarily snarled skein in a fashion comprehensible to the readers who know little of the chaos that was China in the 1920's.

It was Lenin who first saw revolutionary possibilities in China, even before he had suffered disappointment in the European theater. Although he did not elaborate on this subject, in general his policy in Asia was to work with nationalist movements against the imperialist powers, hoping that later on nationalism would give way to Communism. It was left to Stalin to give concrete application to this principle. He did so in dual fashion: by establishing relations with the shaky government at Peking, and by forming a coalition with the struggling Kuomintang of Sun Yat-sen at Canton. To Canton Stalin sent his agent Michael Borodin, with money, arms, and military advisers, to build a modern Kuomintang army. The rising Chinese Communist party was instructed to join the Kuomintang and to obey its leaders. While each group

gained strength from this maneuver, each intended to make use of the other and then cast it aside when its services were no longer needed. For several years, however, this uneasy coalition functioned fairly well, with Chiang Kai-shek, "the Red general," stepping into Dr. Sun's shoes after the latter's death in 1924.

The author makes it very clear that in the complicated game of intrigue and betrayal Chiang Kai-shek outwitted Stalin. The Communists dominated the lower levels of the Kuomintang, while Chiang had the upper levels and the army. Together they made the highly successful Northern Expedition of 1926-1927, which greatly increased the strength of Chiang's army, while at the same time opening vistas for peasant revolution. Once victory had been achieved, Chiang turned on his former allies and massacred the Shanghai proletariat. Even the Left wing of the Kuomintang, with its seat at Wuhan, turned on the Communists and drove their remnants into the wilderness. Stalin's efforts to support a nationalist movement ended with the expulsion of the Russians and a massacre of the Chinese Communists.

In his summation, Dr. Brandt lays Stalin's abysmal failure in part to his ignorance of China and his doctrinaire application of unsuitable formulas. The main reason, however, was the military weakness of the Left in China, which could arouse the masses but could not save them from slaughter. Trotsky fares little better than Stalin. Almost completely ignorant of Chinese affairs, for long he made no proposals, and when he finally urged the setting up of Chinese

soviets, it was too late. Indeed, without strong military support soviets would have been powerless. Mao, who had followed Stalin's orders by cooperating with the Kuomintang, also failed to find the right course. It was only when he had been forced to flee into the mountains and then into the Northwest that he chanced to hit upon the right policy, in spite of the advice of the Comintern.

Dr. Brandt has produced an excellent study, scholarly and judicious, and written in a lively and interesting style. For some reason, however, he has not provided a map, which is greatly needed.

JOHN SHELTON CURTISS  
*Duke University*

SMITH, C. JAY, JR. *Finland and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1922*. Athens, Georgia, University of Georgia Press, 1958. 251 pp. \$4.50.

In this book the author has undertaken the task of giving a factual record of Finland's experiences between 1917 and 1922 in an attempt to increase the reader's understanding of the Russian Revolution. After a few introductory remarks dealing with the Finnish situation prior to 1917 the author tackles the subject of Finland's Civil War. He discusses what he views as the origins of the Civil War and then traces the course of the War to its end. The Finnish Whites' attempt to create a "Large-Finland" by conquering East Karelia is vividly described by the author, and he shows how Finland came into conflict with the Allies, the White Russians, and the Soviet government in pursuing this "Large" policy.

One should note, however, that

there are serious deficiencies and errors in the book under review. Perhaps the most glaring deficiency is the fact that the author has not been able to read, or acquaint himself with, Finnish material on the subject. It is particularly unfortunate that he has not become familiar with the works of Juhani Paasivirta, especially his *Suomi vuonna 1918*, because Mr. Smith could have prevented himself from making many serious mistakes in his interpretation of events connected with the Finnish Civil War.

The most serious error in the book under review lies in the author's understanding of the causes and nature of the Finnish Civil War. The author states that without the presence of Russian troops there could have been no Red *coup d'état* in Helsinki (p. 211), but the facts do not support the author. Furthermore, he views the war as a War of Independence against the Russian troops stationed in Finland, and in expounding this idea he is only repeating the stand of the extreme Finnish right. The Russians furnished Finnish Reds with some arms and supplies, but except for isolated examples Russian soldiers did not fight the Finnish Whites. For the most part they remained passive, although there was a very small group of Russian volunteers who participated actively in the War. The withdrawal of Russian troops from Finland had commenced in October 1917, and, if anything, the outbreak of the Finnish Civil War increased the speed with which the soldiers were removed. The author has apparently placed implicit faith on this subject in the memoirs of M. S. Svechnikov (p. 211), a Russian officer who became one of the leaders of the Finnish

Red military forces. This is indeed an error when one considers the fact that Svechnikov himself was intimately connected with the events and cannot be called unbiased. If the author of the book under review had delved more deeply into the available Russian sources, such as the articles by V. Smirnov that appeared in Soviet journals in the late 1920's, he would have come across statements that would perhaps have caused him to question the extent to which Russian troops participated in the Finnish Civil War.

In addition to the several major errors to be found in the book there are also numerous minor ones, but undoubtedly the author has made a sincere attempt to shed light on an interesting period of both Russian and Finnish history, and on many points he is correct. Therefore, if one keeps in mind that this book does not tell the full story one can learn a great deal about a subject that has not received extensive treatment in English.

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MEIBURGER, SISTER ANNE VINCENT.

*Efforts of Raymond Robins  
Toward the Recognition of Soviet  
Russia and the Outlawry of  
War, 1917-1933.* Washington, D.  
C. Catholic University of America  
Press, 1958. 225 pp. \$2.50.

Among the more colorful characters in American political life in the early part of this century there was none whose image and whose strivings are more obscure, more legendary, more mysterious on the historical record than those of Raymond Robins. The reason for this

lay largely in his own personality and in the way he revealed himself to others: in his exalted mystical view of himself and his mission, his scorn for mundane detail, his talent for self-dramatization, his quixotic ability to read a profound moral content into the most trivial of issues and activities.

All this being the case, and in the light of the fact that Robins' brief encounter with the fledgling Soviet state of 1917-1918 had an important effect on the crystallization of American opinion about Soviet power, Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger, of the Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, Texas, has done a useful service to American history by taking as the theme of her doctoral dissertation Robins' efforts towards the recognition of Russia and the "outlawry of war," and by making the results available to the public at large. In general, the facts of Robins' activities along these lines emerge with reasonable clarity and adequacy from Sister Meiburger's work, and they fill a gap which sooner or later would have had to be filled if the record of American diplomatic history with relation to the Russian problem and the origins of the Kellogg Pact was to be complete.

On the Russian side of Robins' activities, Sister Meiburger's book adds little to what is known of Robins' actual experiences in Russia in the 1917-1918 period and does not go far beneath the surface in attempting to separate the facts of Robins' work from the fevered image of it which he himself created. The account would have been strengthened by the inclusion of more of the evidence that would explain the negative feelings about

Robins which grew up in the American official establishment at that time.

In the recording of Robins' activities after his return to this country, on behalf of Russian recognition, Sister Meiburger treads uncharted ground, and her findings are of much interest and importance. What stands out here is the importance of Alexander Gumberg not only as the person constantly stimulating Robins' flagging interest in the subject of recognition but also as the obvious driving force behind the entire recognition movement.

Sister Meiburger says, in a footnote, "There is nothing in the Robins or Gumberg Papers to indicate that Gumberg was ever implicated in disloyalty to the United States." The writer of this review would know of nothing to controvert that statement. But the truth was certainly more complicated than this bald assertion would suggest; and until the nature of Gumberg's motives is more fully clarified, the student will continue to find it difficult to determine how much of the pressure for American recognition in the twenties reflected the legitimate workings of American opinion, and how much — the calculated manipulation of that opinion, confused and naive as it was, by the Soviet government.

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WRANGEL, GENERAL BARON PETER N. *Always with Honor*. New York, Robert Speller and Sons. 1958, 356 pp. \$5.00.

In Mikhail Sholokhov's *The Quiet Don*, the greatest Soviet nov-

el before the appearance of Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago*, the hero, a Cossack who wavers somewhat between Reds and Whites, expresses envy for those whose minds are made up, who are clearly committed to one side or the other. There could be no better symbol of the dedicated White, who saw in the struggle against Bolshevism the cause of Russian and European religion, culture, and civilization, than the author of these memoirs, now belatedly made available in an English translation.

General Wrangel, a tall impressive military figure in the Circassian uniform which he liked to wear, had been an officer in one of the Tsar's crack cavalry regiments. A thoroughgoing aristocrat in his sympathies and instincts, he was devoted to the Throne and the Orthodox Church. If he did not put forward restoration of the Tsar as his slogan during the time when he was the last standardbearer of the White cause in the Crimea, it was, one suspects, not for lack of sympathy, but because of considerations of expediency, such as absence of an available candidate for the throne and consideration for public sentiment in the West.

Among the military leaders of the White movement Wrangel ranks only after Denikin and Kolchak in significance. And he perhaps excelled both in firmness of purpose and hardness of will, although by the time he came into supreme power in 1920 the decisive campaigns had been fought, and all that was possible was a gallant last stand in the picturesque Crimea, with its coastline suggestive of the French Riviera.

Wrangel's memoirs are an important, although naturally sub-



jective source of information about the anti-Bolshevik movement in South Russia. After the break-up of the Russian army in 1917 Wrangel retired to the Crimea, where he narrowly escaped being shot by a revolutionary tribunal that was meting out lynch law to suspected members of the former upper class. From this danger he was freed when the Germans moved into the Crimea and he expresses as follows his mixed feelings at the sight of "Prussian soldiers on the highway marching in good order": "Deeply grieved as I was to see the enemy master of Russia, and my country disgraced, I was nevertheless happy at being free from the humiliating yoke of those blockheaded idiots."

Wrangel joined the Volunteer Army of General Denikin, which was fighting against the Reds in the North Caucasus, and soon acquired a reputation as one of its most daring and successful cavalry commanders. (The Russian civil war was the last conflict when cavalry played a considerable role.) Later, when Denikin moved out of the Cossack areas of the Kuban and the Don and started his drive through Ukraine, with Moscow as his ultimate objective, Wrangel was in command of the right wing. His finest hour was perhaps on June 19, 1919, when he captured Tsaritsin, on the Volga, called the Red Verdun, later renamed Stalingrad.

There were elements of friction and disagreement, military and political, between Wrangel and Denikin; and Wrangel's side of the story is naturally told in the memoirs. The author makes the plausible military criticism that Denikin spread his thin forces too diffusely over a very wide front, and con-

sequently lacked strength at the decisive points at the decisive moments. He also sternly censures the failure to put down the looting and debauchery which alienated the sympathy of the population and weakened the White cause.

There were, of course, deeper political reasons for the failure of the various White leaders. They could not compete with Lenin and Trotsky in unscrupulous demagoguery. And in the territories which they temporarily freed from Communist rule they set the political, economic and social course too sharply in a restorationist direction. They did not recognize that, apart from the crimes and follies of Communism, there were widespread popular demands for land and labor reform and for recognition of the identity of the non-Russian peoples.

Given their personal backgrounds and their sufferings in the early phase of the Revolution, given the sentiments of the groups where they found most support, the White leaders perhaps could not have acted otherwise. They put up a brave fight against overwhelming numerical odds and the history of Russia and of Europe would most probably have been changed for the better if Denikin had taken Moscow instead of being driven back in disorderly rout and collapse from his farthest point of advance, Orel.

Wrangel took over the leadership of the White cause at a very low ebb, when the remnants of the White armies, demoralized by retreat and defeat were huddled in the Crimea, when England was withdrawing the support which it had extended to Denikin. It is typical of Wrangel's spirit that, when he was informed of this impending



withdrawal of support, he promptly decided to assume the almost hopeless task of taking over the military leadership which had fallen from the hands of Denikin.

Working sternly and energetically, he brought order out of chaos, inflicted some defeats on the Red Army, tried to arouse the Kuban Cossacks to rebel and aimed at the creation, in the limited area under his control, of model conditions of personal security and internal order. But it was too late for this policy to succeed; the ending of the war with Poland made it possible for the Red Army to throw overwhelming forces against Wrangel's stronghold in the Crimea. When the defenses on the Isthmus of Perekop were stormed Wrangel carried out a masterly and successful evacuation of the 150,000 Russians, two-thirds soldiers, the remainder civilians, who preferred the uncertain prospect of exile to life under Communism.

During the few remaining years of his life Wrangel was indefatigable in looking out for the well-being of those who had followed his leadership on the losing side in the civil war. Even to-day one can find groups of Russians in exile who pay to Wrangel's memory something of the honor which Southerners pay to that of Robert E. Lee.

The translation is adequate and there is a good index. But the system of transliterating Russian names is weird and apt to cause confusion. *Ch* is habitually used where *sh* would convey the sound much more phonetically. There are also occasional slips with names, the American Admiral MacCul-

lough being referred to as MacCully.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN  
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HUNTER, HOLLAND. *Soviet Transportation Policy*. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1957. 416 pp. \$8.50.

Professor Hunter has been engaged for some years in the study of the Soviet transportation system. Now we have the results of his research ingeniously packaged in this recent publication of the Russian Research Center Series. The narrative of the main part of the book proceeds with little discussion of statistical problems, but the detailed citations and calculations underlying his conclusions are provided in an appendix of 100 pages.

The theme of the book is the relationship of transportation and industrialization — a relationship which poses a serious problem of balance for economic planners. The rapid growth of industrial output implies a rapid growth in the work of transportation as an inescapable concomitant, but at the same time the lavish provision of transportation capacity would divert capital from industry and so hinder rapid expansion of the economy. The Soviet response to this problem has been essentially to save resources for industrialization by greatly intensifying the utilization of railroad plant. Hunter shows the repercussions of this policy in such areas as locational policy, the power relationship between the transportation and industrial bureaucracies, and the technical operating characteristics of Soviet railroads. After careful examination of trends in technol-

ogy, capital productivity, output-traffic ratios, and so on, he concludes that the Russians can continue in the future their approach of minimal investment in transportation plant without turning transportation into a bottleneck.

ROBERT W. CAMPBELL  
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WREN, MELVIN C. *The Course of Russian History*. New York, Macmillan, 1958. 724 pp. \$6.95.

Professor Wren of Montana State University has written a standard, rather conventional textbook for college use. The clarity of writing, the number and variety of the illustrations, and the twenty-two, specially drawn maps make the book a welcome addition to the textbook list. The opening and closing summaries which appear in most chapters are an added attraction.

Professor Wren's *Course* begins with pre-history and continues as a chronological narrative to 1921. At that point, it changes from a chronological to a topical treatment; the last chapters dealing with the state, the economy, social and cultural developments, and foreign relations in that order. The space allotments are as follows: to Peter the Great, 244 pages; from Peter to 1917, 288 pages; 1917 to 1956, 178 pages. There is no annotated bibliography and no general bibliography, but "Suggested Readings" — some of them in general European histories — are supplied for most chapters.

The general approach is deliberately and strongly institutional, and the heaviest emphasis is on war and politics. Over seven pages are

devoted to the Napoleonic invasion; four, to the law of 19 February; and two, to the Zemstva reform. The treatment of Marx and of Lenin's early years is very brief. Economic and social developments are not, however, ignored. Conventional interpretations prevail throughout. Catherine II, for example, is "a true benevolent despot;" Paul, "not quite sane;" Alexander I, "a royal enigma;" and Nicholas I, "the policeman of Europe." Most of the standard anecdotes ("Saddle your horses, gentlemen, France has proclaimed a republic.") are used.

Approach and emphasis are matters of personal choice, and there are many who hold the unconventional to be out of place in a textbook. Others may prefer a somewhat fresher, bolder look. Professor Wren's book will please the former more than the latter. There are relatively few serious factual slips — a major accomplishment in so long and complicated a story. This reviewer's major reproach is that the unannotated "Reading Suggestions" may lead the novice reader astray. Some comment as to relative reliability certainly should be attached to such books, for example, as those of Dillon and Oudard.

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SIMMONS, ERNEST J. *Russian Fiction and Soviet Ideology. Introduction to Fedin, Leonov, and Sholokhov*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1958. 267 pp. \$4.75.

Each of the three long essays in Professor Simmons' latest volume could be considered a separate

study of an outstanding Soviet writer. Fedin, Leonov, and Sholokhov operate independently of each other, and differ greatly in their interests, personalities, fundamental allegiances, and artistic techniques. Still, the juxtaposition is itself suggestive, the more so as it results from an invariable approach: Professor Simmons moves chronologically through an author's work, recapitulating plots in great detail, commenting on the motivation of characters, and noting, where appropriate, growth and development of an author's skill. There are further comments on some of the themes and conflicts of each work, as well as their relationship to the author's general interests and political orientation.

Inevitably, the reader of this volume must question its purpose. The title would lead one to expect a discussion of the relationship between Soviet ideology and fiction, but ideology — and history — are treated only in the most perfunctory manner. Two pages (pp. 103-4) dispose of NEP, the Five Year Plans, and RAPP. On the other hand an exclamation point makes it clear that no one reading this book could possibly confuse the intentions of Kerensky and Kornilov (p. 219), that is, that the course of the revolution and its aftermath are common knowledge. This suggests that the book is designed for those who have considerable familiarity with the topic and would, for example, understand why Fedin's *No Ordinary Summer* should have caused a furor in Russia without having the reasons specifically stated. The volume really deals only with the achievement of three writers viewed apart from the complex developments of Soviet politics and

literature. Perhaps the volume was intended as an introduction to these writers for those who do not read Russian or know the field. A list of "Works Discussed and Available English Translations" (pp. 253-5) replaces the expected bibliography or critical apparatus.

While there may be disagreement on the specific import of a scene, character or even a whole novel, Professor Simmons presents considered, cogent and valid interpretations. Indeed, teachers of Soviet literature will have to devise specific questions on the text to ascertain if students have read the novel or Professor Simmons' elaborate summaries. Unfortunately there is a proliferation of qualifying "perhapses," otherwise unsubstantiated judgments of material as "unconvincing," or, alternatively, as "sensitive" and having "insight," as well as a number of methodological shortcomings. The volume suffers from the assumption that because a character's feelings or thoughts correspond to some aspect of party doctrine that character necessarily "symbolizes" this view and that his function in a novel is to introduce a state of mind or political position that is historically true. Whole books can become mirrors of certain controversies. Thus Fedin's *The Brothers* is seen as a study in the possible development of national art (p. 39-40), and Leonov's *Skutarevsky* as a reflection of the demoralization of the intelligentsia in the early 1930's (p. 112). The notion that fundamental historical accuracy and reportage provide the basic ingredient in the novel presumably facilitates the curious view that ideologically reprehensible but artistically well realized characters, particularly in Leonov, represent

the "unconscious triumph of artistic integrity over ideological bias" (p. 130). Professor Simmons also speculates about the silences of his three writers and the possible content and resolution of works whose publication was recently begun and then halted. At best, such speculations are precarious. Professor Simmons demonstrates in the case of Sholokhov that Soviet novels are repeatedly rewritten to suit ideological demands. The state's views change. Material that may have been in bad odor when this volume was written is now more acceptable. A glance at Fedin's latest *Collected Works* will indicate that substantial portions have been reprinted of his *Gorky Among Us* (p. 59).

The volume deals less satisfactorily with the surface of the texts. At the end of the essay on Leonov we are told that "on this superb gift of language rests his clearest title to originality." The gift was first broached and described in the three preceding lines (pp. 160-1). Similarly the discussion of dialogue (p. 167) or lexical difficulties in Sholokhov does not contribute much to our understanding of his art.

Professor Simmons writes of "those novelists whose image of the present reflects the past and whose concern with life often represents a search beyond time and space for the universal determinants of human behavior" (p. 89). By reducing the richness of his material to manageable scope Professor Simmons emphasizes these elements but also deprives them of their individual, personal significance. Such simplification minimizes the tragic waste of talent, the platitudinous and drossy writing so apparent even in these

works, as does the implied roseate view that gifted writers can work in comparative harmony with the Central Committee, and that the relationship can be productive.

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ZAVALISHIN, VYACHESLAV. *Early Soviet Writers*. Published for the Research Program on the U.S.S.R. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. 394 pp. \$7.50.

The overall impression produced by this book is an odd one. Its composition, and some of the things the author says in his "Introduction," makes it appear as though it were designed to supplement the present reviewer's *Soviet Russian Literature*, to fill in the gaps in the latter for the early period of Soviet literature. This is a perfectly legitimate task, and up to a point the author discharges it quite usefully, providing more or less detailed vignettes of such interesting Soviet authors as Nikolay Klyuev, Sergey Klychkov, Alexander Yakovlev, Artyom Vesoly, Andrey Platonov, and a few others. These vignettes do not build up into a consecutive history of Soviet literary developments, but they are subordinated to a certain pattern. The author's *idée maitresse* is formulated by him in his Introduction as follows: "... the eventual history of Soviet literature under its specific conditions will inevitably be written in terms of its writers' need for 'freedom of creation, the inner freedom.'" The author then explains that this conviction has determined "the unconventional arrangement" of his materials: "So far as possible, the body of each writer's work is considered

as a whole in which different phases may often be discerned in accordance with his enjoyment or relinquishment of creative freedom or struggle for it. The period in his career when he appeared to write most freely is then used as the criterion for a loose chronological grouping of his work with that of others who also expressed themselves with least inhibition at approximately the same time."

Mr. Zavalishin does not, however, always live up to his good intentions, and whatever merits the book possesses as a source of information about certain aspects of Soviet post-revolutionary literature, they are largely offset by very serious defects. There are, in the first place, too many names, and about many of them too little is said to be worth saying at all (this is particularly true of the sections on peasant poets and on proletarian prose writers). To use a Russian proverb, "one cannot see the wood from the trees"; the general pattern of Soviet literary development is too often lost behind the minutiae of such miniature individual portraits, especially as we learn very little about the writers' personalities. This situation is further aggravated by the author dragging in unnecessarily the pre-revolutionary work of some of the writers, especially of the Symbolist and Acmeist poets, some of whom should not be included in the Soviet period of Russian literature. There is also considerable disproportion in the amount of space devoted to individual writers.

Some of these and other defects are due to the haziness of the author's chronological scope. By confining himself to "early" Soviet writers Mr. Zavalishin apparently

had in mind the period between 1917 and 1929. On more than one occasion he speaks of the end of the New Economic Policy as his *terminus ad quem*. His last chapter is entitled "Prose during the Uneasy Truce (1925-1929)," and here we read in the introductory section (p. 270): "The full-scale realistic novel, the revival of which is usually considered to be signalized by the publication of Fedin's *Cities and Years* in 1924, established itself as the leading genre during the years before the inception of the First Five-Year Plan. However, the writers who contributed most to the revival of the realistic novel — for example, Sholokhov, Fedin and Aleksei Tolstoy — displayed their powers to the full at a later time; only those who produced their major work during the NEP period are discussed in this chapter." Evidently Mr. Zavalishin does not regard Fedin's *Cities and Years* and *Brothers* as his "major work," for he by-passes him altogether without a further word of explanation (as he does Sholokhov, Tolstoy, Nikitin, Ehrenburg, and some other important prose writers of the twenties), while in the case of Leonov, who is dealt with all too briefly, his post-1929 work is, quite inconsistently, included in the discussion (even the 1953 *Russian Forest*).

Similar unjustifiable omissions and disproportions are to be found in the chapters dealing with the poets. While Selvinsky's work is projected well beyond the established chronological limit, of Bezymensky it is said that he is "outside the bounds of this book" (p. 238). Still more bizarre is the complete omission of Pasternak and Bagritsky. The latter, who died in 1934



and much of whose best and most "uninhibited" work was written before 1930, is not so much as mentioned. As for Pasternak, his name is mentioned five times, but there is no special section on him and no discussion of his work, neither verse nor prose. After being credited, on the very first page of the book, with the statement that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat need not be a dictatorship of the mediocre, Pasternak is fleetingly referred to four times in connection with other writers: on p. 56 in connection with Mandelstam; on p. 89, with the Futurists of the Centrifuga group; on p. 214, with Larisa Reisner; and on p. 299, with Yuri Olesha. One of these references is an obvious error of judgment — it was certainly not Pasternak who was "directly descended" from Mandelstam, but the late Mandelstam who was influenced by Pasternak (and Khlebnikov) — while another is very questionable. In general, it is, of course, strange to see Pasternak excluded, especially in the light of the above quoted explanations of the author in his Introduction: it was during the twenties that Pasternak wrote with the greatest freedom and produced some of his best and most original work, both in verse and in prose. The English-speaking reader who has become familiar with Pasternak's name only after the publication of *Doctor Zhivago* has been told over and over again that way back in the twenties Pasternak was regarded by the Russians as a first-rate poet. What will he think of Mr. Zavalishin's refusal to discuss his work when poets like Oreshin, Shershenevich, Kazin, Tretyakov, Inber, and many others, have sub-chapters devoted to them?!

The omission of Tikhonov and Zabolotsky — even though the latter published only one book before 1930 — also contradicts the principle enunciated by Mr. Zavalishin in his Introduction.

Mr. Zavalishin's literary judgments unfortunately do not inspire confidence. He overrates many minor Soviet writers and devotes too much room to them. This is true of Panteleymon Romanov, of Artyom Vesoly, of Andrey Platonov, and especially of Alexander Grin. The last-named is a very good illustration of the Russian proverb *na bezryb'i i rak ryba* (when there are no fish then even a crayfish is a fish): it is amazing to see how he has captivated the imagination of some Soviet writers and of so many of post World War II Soviet émigrés outside Russia. It is also strange to read of Yuri Olesha as a writer exemplifying "extreme simplicity" (p. 299); or of Mikhail Bulgakov as one of the few writers "who were still faithful to the classical tradition of Pushkin and Tolstoy" (p. 329); or that Andrey Bely derived his "syncretism of moods" (whatever that means) from Apollon Grigoryev (p. 31). When Mr. Zavalishin makes the sweeping statement that Bely's two "Moscow" novels "in intellectual depth, intuitive premonition of Russia's future, understanding of Russian psychology, or vastness of conception" are superior to anything in post-revolutionary literature (p. 36), one would like to see some argument in support of it. And to say that Vsevolod Rozhdestvensky's verse "is very musical, but . . . not infrequently descends to the level of a popular love song" (p. 60) is so wide of the mark that one suspects that Mr. Zavalishin is not familiar



with Rozhdestvensky's poetry, at least not with his early volumes which were in the best Acmeist tradition.

In the short (four and one-half pages) sub-chapter on Gumilyov the ratio of misstatements is particularly high, especially if one takes into account the fact that in 1947-48 Mr. Zavalishin brought out in Germany an edition of Gumilyov's Collected Poems (true, that edition had better be forgotten, so many defects did it have). Mr. Zavalishin begins by tracing Gumilyov's early poetry, quite apodictically, to Edgar Allan Poe and Sir Rider Haggard (p. 42). He then asserts that "the common denominator" of Gumilyov's poems in *Ognenny stolp* is "hatred of the revolution" (p. 45), although only one poem in that volume (the prophetic and surrealistic "Streetcar That Went Astray") can be remotely linked with the Revolution. He also says that in his poem "The Worker" the poet "foretold his own death at the hands of those schooled to destruction by the new leaders" (p. 45), though actually in the poem the worker who fashioned the bullet which is to strike the poet is a German munitions worker! Contrary to what Mr. Zavalishin says, the volume "*K siney zvezde*" was not published in Petrograd; nor, since the poems in that book, published posthumously (in Berlin), were written in 1917, before those in *Ognenny stolp*, is it right to speak of Gumilyov having "once more returned to his delicate lyricism" (p. 45). It is very doubtful whether the "disagreements" between Gumilyov and Blok arose mainly from the differences of their opinion about the Revolution (p. 46.) Examples of similar errors of

fact and judgment could be easily multiplied.

There are also some very questionable statements of general nature. Even if one is to admit the "national" element in the Bolshevik Revolution, the following statement is hardly justified: "To Russia, the revolution meant self-destruction, self-burning. In this faith in the cleansing power of fire Lenin and the Russian people were as one" (p. 13). Yet, this underlies much of Zavalishin's interpretation of Alexander Blok's post-revolutionary poetry.

The sentence on p. 18, comparing some views of Blok's father with those of the poet in his *Retribution*, does not make sense unless for "he had not shared" one reads "he had shared." There are also some mistranslations for which the author is not to blame: on pp. 8, 9, and 116 the translators speak of "syllabic versification" where the author obviously has in mind the Russian *tonico-syllabic* system. In the title of Platnov's book *Epifanskie shlyuzy* (p. 249), the word "Epifanskie" comes not from "Epiphany," but from the town of Epifan. Most of the verse translations in the book, despite (or because of) the gallant attempt to retain the meter and the rhyme scheme, do little justice to the originals.

On the whole, in its present shape, the book is in many ways a disappointment.

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TURGENEV, IVAN. *Literary Reminiscences*. Tran. with an introduction by David Magarshack and an Essay by Edmund Wilson. New York, Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1958. 309 pp. \$5.00.

A more accurate title for this book would be "A Turgenev Miscellany," for it contains Edmund Wilson's sixty-page essay on Turgenev, reprinted from *The New Yorker*, and a thirty-five page introduction by David Magarshack, as well as thirteen of Turgenev's shorter articles, sketches, and reminiscences.

Edmund Wilson, to whom students of Russian literature are indebted for essays on Pushkin, Gogol, and Pasternak, approaches Turgenev with his characteristically broad and humanistic manner. Examining Turgenev's childhood, his relationship to his mother, and his later life, Wilson surveys his literary career and relates the facts of his biography to his works. Wilson avoids jargon, pedantry, biographical criticism. He makes penetrating remarks not only on Turgenev's individual works, but also on such topics as the contrasts between the appearance and personality Russians abroad present to foreigners and to fellow nationals, and Russian attitudes towards that "constant factor in Russian life, an ever-recurring phenomenon of history: the bad master whom one cannot resist." He discusses the major themes of Turgenev's writings (such as the dominant woman and the Evil Power or demon) and the strengths and weaknesses of his works. The criticism of Edmund Wilson, whether developing new points or restating familiar ones, is always clear, considered, and grounded on deep knowledge of

world literature.

The introduction by Magarshack, author of a fine biography of Turgenev, presents thumbnail sketches of the persons referred to by Turgenev (Alexander Voykov, Prince Vladimir Odoevsky, and many others), discusses the circumstances under which Turgenev wrote the several pieces, and supplies much background information, including editorial and historical facts surrounding the relevant periodicals (*The Moscow Telegraph*, *The Telescope*, *The Library for Reading*, and others.) The introduction is a compilation of explanatory material most useful to the general reader. Densely packed with facts, it is more like a miniature encyclopedia than an essay designed to be read through. All the more pity, therefore, that the book should lack an index, though granted the volume is aimed at the general public rather than the specialist.

It is also a pity that some of Turgenev's own explanatory notes have been silently dropped from the text. The notes by Y. G. Oksman and B. M. Eikhenbaum in the tenth and eleventh volumes of the recent twelve-volume Turgenev *Sobranie sochinenii* will have to be used by the serious student to supplement Magarshack's material. On the other hand, many places in Magarshack's introduction are necessary additions to the Soviet editors' remarks.

Turgenev's works translated in this volume are: "A Literary Party at P. A. Pletnyov's," "Reminiscences of Belinsky," "Gogol, Zhukovsky, Krylov, Lermontov, Zagoskin," "A Trip to Albano and Frascati," "A propos of *Father and Sons*," "The Man in the Grey Spectacles," "My Mates Sent Me!" (British for

"*Nashi poslalil'*"), "The Execution of Tropmann," "About Nightingales," "Pégas," "Pergamos Excavations," "The Quail," and "A Fire at Sea." Their availability in English will be most welcome. Most of them are of great intrinsic value. The first three reveal Turgenev's ability to draw in a few strokes memorable, life-like portraits of persons he met — particularly outstanding is that of Belinsky. Next in importance are "A Fire at Sea" and "The Execution of Tropmann," vivid, detailed narratives artistically and psychologically relevant to Turgenev's fiction. "The Man in the Grey Spectacles" and "Pergamos Excavations" are weak pieces, but some of the remaining sketches are endowed with humor, gentle precision, and human sympathy.

GEORGE GIBIAN

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LUCKYJ, GEORGE (Ed.). *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. II, Canadian Association of Slavists, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957. 132 pp. \$3.00.

KONOVALOV S. (Ed.). *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, Vol. VIII. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958. 166pp. 18/.

Russia is the subject of seven of the thirteen contributions to Volume II of the *Canadian Slavonic Papers*. In "Byzantium, Russia and Caesaropapism," Steven Runciman voices a highly articulate protest against the oversimplified ordering of historical causality embodied in the thesis that Russia is the result of Byzantine Caesaropapism and its mystique of the Oecumene. After showing that "Caesaropapist" is not a very meaningful

characterization of the symbiotic relationship of Emperor and Patriarch in Byzantium, Runciman suggests that indigenous developments have been far more decisive for modern Russia than was Byzantium — the Mongols and their legacy of autocracy, to mention just one. Stuart Tompkins, in a splendid article on "*Vekhi* and the Russian Intelligentsia," studies the nature of the challenge the *Vekhi* contributors aimed at the materialistic assumptions on which the radical intelligentsia since Dobroliubov had acted. Tompkins, a master of the connotative statement, weaves *Vekhi* into the fabric of intelligentsia ideas beginning with the Slavophil-Westerner controversy. *Vekhi* emerges as the full expression of a series of dissents with socialism, yet it becomes the tragic symbol of a reappraisal which began too late.

The offerings by L. Ignatieff ("Rights and Obligations in Russia and the West") and W. J. Stankiewicz ("The Development of Different Attitudes toward Welfare in Russian and British Socialist Thought") should be read together with Runciman's and Tompkins's papers. Ignatieff contrasts the Western idea, rooted in feudalism, of the supremacy of law even to the ruler (rights), with the non-feudal Russian concept of the supremacy of the ruler (obligations). Stankiewicz supposes that the adoption by the Russians of Marxism as both a method and a credo has precluded the articulation of a genuine concept of welfare, whereas the relative indifference to Marxism in Britain has allowed socialism there to become really welfare-conscious. This is another way of putting the rights-obligations contrast, which we also find implicit

in *Vekhi's* criticism of the Russian intelligentsia's unconcern with personal freedom (Tompkins). Both Ignatieff and Stankiewicz emphasize these differences in values as a fundamental source of East-West misunderstanding. Tompkins and Runciman too are interested in the realities of "misunderstanding," though in a somewhat different perspective: Tompkins communicates a sense of the tragedy of the intelligentsia's misunderstanding of its role in Russian life, whereas Runciman explores the more wilful and self-induced misunderstanding in one Western view of Russia.

Also included in the C.S.P. are: H. W. Dewey's "Historical Drama in Muscovite Justice," an interesting study of a Sixteenth-century court decision; H. E. Ronimois's "Soviet Experiment with Communist Economy, 1918-20," where we see that War Communism has been the only Soviet economic experiment directly reflecting the ideas of Marx; and C. Bryner's "Lenin and the Search for an Elite," a potentially valuable article which suffers from the absence of a central unifying idea. We regret that this volume contains no paper on Russian literature; but we should note that Polish and Ukrainian literature, underplayed in many general-Slavic publications, are here represented by one article each.

Volume VIII of the *Oxford Slavonic Papers* offers several excellent articles on Russia. P. N. Berkov, of the University of Leningrad, makes an important but regrettably brief amendment to our scanty knowledge of one aspect of Anglo-Russian literary relations in his "English Plays in St. Petersburg in the 1760's and 1770's." The extensive use of foreign sources, as well as

the subject itself, reflect the greater catholicity of recent Soviet scholarship and encourage hope for a more comprehensive study. D. P. Costello attributes "The Murder of Griboedov" to a deliberate Persian plot, and not to British iniquity or to Griboedov's own actions. In "Russian Grammars before Lomonosov," B. O. Unbegaun describes the well-known grammar of Ludolf and the important but neglected works of Kopijewitz (1706), Adodurov (1731) and Groening (1750). S. Konovalov continues his publications of Russian royal correspondence, this time with twenty letters from Tsar Mikhail and Patriarch Filaret to Charles I of England. And V. du Feu, in "Some Features of the Vocabulary of Russian Royal Letters (1613-38)," gives a fascinating account of the role of non-Russian elements in the Russian diplomatic style, emphasizing the importance of the Lithuanian chancellery language as a medium for the transmission of foreign words, especially Polish.

R. A. MACUIRE

Duke University

SCHAKOVSKOY, PRINCESS ZINAIDA.  
*The Privilege Was Mine.* New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959. 318 pp. \$4.00.

Ever since the outbreak of the October Revolution there have been a great many books, memoirs, autobiographies and novels which depict the life and fate of the Russian émigrés. There are also whole library shelves of volumes written by statesmen, journalists and world travelers who have visited Soviet Russia and recorded their impressions of the land, the people, and

the men in the Kremlin.

Now Princess Zinaida Schakovskoy, who traces her family tree all the way back to the ninth century, has published an account about Soviet Russia which belongs in a category of its own. In her book *The Privilege Was Mine* we hear the voice of a Russian princess who left her country at the age of fourteen and remembers her carefree childhood and the terrifying time when she was held a hostage before she made her escape. Like many of her countrymen the author went through all the turmoil, torment and adventures of emigration, but unlike the rest she was able to return to her native land 37 years later, in 1956 during the time of the "Thaw" which followed de-Stalinization. The privilege that was hers is an émigré's dream come true. For thanks to her marriage to a Belgian diplomat of Russian descent the once exiled princess found herself in the enviable position of enjoying complete diplomatic immunity. Thus she was not only free to roam the country at will, but also came face to face with the executioners of the old Russia she used to cherish.

She tells about it with forcefulness and insight. "The daughter of a political prisoner, I climbed the monumental staircase [of the Kremlin] to sit down at a meal with his former jailers, — and climbed them without ill-feeling. I was the symbol of a defeated past, brought face to face with the victorious present. And yet, I had the impression that I, too, had triumphed. I had survived. I had placed liberty over country."

She records her conversations with Bulganin, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Marshal Zhu-

kov and with Serov, then Chief of Police, who sat next to her during the state luncheon. When he amiably asked her whether he could be of help to have her meet some members of her family who were still living in Russia, she replied candidly: "It's unlikely that I have any relatives left in Russia. They must all have been shot long ago." "Not all of them, though," cried Serov, genuinely shocked. "There must be a few left!"

Many of the foreign correspondents who report from Moscow have made the effort of learning the language so as to be able to talk to the people without the benefit and interference of state appointed interpreters. But this returned aristocrat has spoken Russian since her birth and therefore she understands not only the spoken words but also each intonation, each pause, and the brooding silences. Her talk with people from all walks of life convinced her that "the Soviet citizen leads a double life, the collective and social life in which he is never alone, and his inner life made up of silence and closely guarded secrets . . . In spite of the frantic propaganda which has gone on now for nearly half a century, the Russian people, unlike some other nations subjected to a comparable dictatorship, has preserved its independence of judgment and intellectual curiosity."

The book covers a great deal of ground. It deals with life in cities and villages, with the world of letters, with the arts, with the church and the state. The author brings to her task the keen eye, the pointed pen and the clear mind of a versatile journalist, who has been attached to the Allied commands during World War II, has covered



the Nuremberg Trials, and witnessed the civil war in Greece. The style of the book benefits furthermore by the fact the Princess Shakhovskoy is an accomplished writer who has made a name for herself under the pseudonym of Jacques Croisé and has many successful novels to her credit. Her unusual combination of talents makes this work a truly fascinating document.

RENE FUELOEP-MILLER  
Hunter College

KALB, MARVIN L. *Eastern Exposure*. New York, Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1958. 332 pp. \$4.50.

This is a generally interesting book about the Russia of 1956 as viewed by a Harvard graduate student then at work as a press attaché in the American Embassy in Moscow. The form is that of a journal but much of the comment has obviously been entered *ex post facto*. There is much breezy chit-chat with Soviet people, gossip within Moscow's Western community, and travel notes on places sometimes off the beaten path of the Intourist guest. Commendable are the descriptions of Kiev's *Podol* ("possibly the last ghetto in Eastern Europe"), the native quarter of Tashkent ("An old man stopped his camel in the middle of the street, and he and the camel stooped over and took a long drink from the rut which ran along the street") and of Bukhara ("The general impression of poverty, filth, dust, and heat is oppressive").

The author's accounts of the informal talks which he had with Soviet citizens are valuable for the light they cast on the popular mood during the thaw but not

much more. Thus, a television engineer is said to have counted 27 television stations throughout the U.S.S.R. as of February, 1956. An official manual released over a year later puts the number of stations at 19. Also, a Georgian student is said to have described the Tbilisi disturbances of March 9, 1956 in terms that coincided almost exactly with what the author had heard earlier from American journalists who had just returned to Moscow after talking "in the darker alleys of Tbilisi." Suffice it here to say that the account which these alleyfarers gave the author led him to conclude that the Tbilisi events constituted "the greatest rebellion against Soviet power since the *Basmachi* outbursts in Central Asia in the twenties." From my own informal talks with young Georgians I am convinced that this is one great exaggeration and I advise future readers not to place too much credence in this version of the incident.

The moods and attitudes of Soviet youth are ably revealed as are some of the events that attended the ferment that quickened and rose to the surface in the wake of de-Stalinization. But I find the author's evaluation of the widespread youthful skepticism to smack of a primitive subjectivism that is inconsistent with his avowed devotion to "historicism." Thus, one reads: "I felt that the future of Russia rests in the logic and emotional strength of many Volodyas, who are capable of recognizing a fact, without relating it to a religious-political dogma. In him sits the destiny of Russia in this century. He will either strip away the political and ideological nonsense and reconstruct his country so that



it may live genuinely in peace with its neighbors, or through panic and fear he will unleash its newly-gained power to throw the world into an ugly catastrophe. The Volodyas can do either." Vive Carlyle!

Aside from considerable misspelling of Russian names and terms there are such bitter fruits of inadequate proof-reading as: Pankratova is "Education Minister," p. 25; "the Central State Archives are under the direct control of the MVD," p. 27, but on p. 322, "all Archives are under the direct control of the MGB"; Rykov is listed as a Jew on p. 28. Stalin's death is given as

March 6, instead of 5, 1953, p. 29; the Georgian poet Shota Rustaveli is called Rastrelli, p. 193.

Considered in its entirety, this book is worthwhile for the initiated, but likely further to confound the already confounded. The perceptive returnee from Sovietland ought either to restrict himself to three or four solid articles or if eager to have a book of his own he should model it on Michael Gordey's *Visa to Moscow*. But the latter choice involves a considerable expenditure of time and effort.

S. I. PLOSS

Brooklyn, N. Y.

## Letter to the Editor

Dear Sir:

Permit me to correct a few regrettable errors in Professor Fedor Stepun's highly informative and thoughtful article "The Russian Intelligentsia and Bolshevism" in the October 1958 issue of *The Russian Review*.

1. On page 266 Stepun writes: "... Gorky, soon after the revolution of 1905, succeeded in fleecing the bourgeoisie of millions of rubles for the further conduct of the revolution." This is not correct. Gorky collected from the bourgeoisie (chiefly from the Moscow millionaire "Sava" Morozov) not "millions of rubles," but less than 100,000 rubles; and that was *before* the revolution of 1905. Soon after the revolution, in the Spring of 1906, Gorky left Russia and did not return until the end of 1913.

2. On page 267 Stepun writes: "The socialist Alexander Herzen, with passionate enthusiasm hastened to Paris, the holy city of the revolution, but soon returned to Russia, because he recognized the soul of Europe to be that of a Philistine." Herzen *never* returned to Russia; he died abroad in 1870. The error here is very likely not Stepun's, but the translator's. What Stepun probably means is that Herzen *turned to Russia in his thoughts* about the future of socialism.

3. On page 268 Stepun writes: "In the sixties, the sons of clerics (Chernyshevsky and Pisarev) became vocal and influential." Pisarev was an individualist, not a socialist, and he was the son of a nobleman, not a cleric. Stepun undoubtedly means Dobroliubov, who, like Chernyshevsky, was the son of a priest and who was Chernyshevsky's closest friend and collaborator.

4. On page 271 Stepun writes that Plekhanov, the founder and most important theoretician of the Russian social democracy, was imprisoned for a year by the Bolsheviks after they

seized power. Plekhanov was molested by Bolshevik sailors right after the Bolsheviks gained control; they threatened to kill him, but he was finally left alone. His wife and friends took him first to a private hospital in Petrograd and later transferred him to a sanitorium in Finland, where he died May 30, 1918, six months after the Bolsheviks came to power.

DAVID SHUB

*New York, N. Y.*  
December 3, 1958

#### S. PROKOFIEV'S LETTERS

Harvard University Library has received from a private donor a gift of numerous letters written by the late Russian composer Sergei Prokofiev between 1920 and 1936. Under conditions of this gift, the letters are to remain sealed until January 1, 1982.

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